John Bruton

Opinions & Ideas

Page 2 of 48

TWO YEAR PERIOD FOR NEGOTIATING BREXIT CAN, AND SHOULD, BE EXTENDED

I am delighted to be invited to speak at this important launch.  I congratulate Skoda on the recent rapid growth in sales in the Irish market.

I would like to talk this morning about Brexit.

I believe that Brexit will do disproportionate damage to the motor industry, which is one of Europe’s premier industries. It depends for its efficiency on complex supply chains, and these will be disrupted if the UK Government persists with its intention to leave the EU Customs Union and Single Market.

The risk of the UK simply crashing out of the EU remains high. The fact that Mrs May has had to postpone her planned speech on Brexit, points in that direction.  So does her slap down of Philip Hammond for saying that the changes in the EU/UK trade relationship would be “modest”. That slap down is hardly consistent with her promises in regard to the Irish border, which still have to be converted into Treaty language.

The gap between popular expectations and practical possibilities remains dangerously wide.

The two year time limit to conclude the negotiation of the terms for UK withdrawal from the EU is, as we are slowly learning, far too short.

The implications of UK withdrawal have not, even yet, been fully discovered by the negotiators on either side. New complications and hypotheses are emerging every day. These arise because we are only now digging down into 40 years worth of trade deals, memberships, and understandings, which the UK can only be part of, so long as it is in the EU.

It would be in the interest of Ireland if the UK were to decides either not to leave the EU at all, or, failing that, decides to rejoin the EU, on terms acceptable to Ireland.

How might this happen? This is the question I am attempting to answer in a paper to be published today by the Institute of International and European Affairs.

The UK hopes to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 but to continue to have access to the EU market for a two year Transition Period, ending on 29 March 2021.This date was presumably chosen because it is before the scheduled date of the UK General Election.

I believe this Transition Period approach is a mistake. I believe it would be simpler and wiser for the UK and the EU to agree to extend the period for negotiation under Article 50 by two or more additional years. This can be done by unanimous agreement.

DISADVANTAGES OF THE PRESENT” TRANSITION PERIOD” APPROACH

At the moment, the UK is seeking a two year transition period, after March 2019, during which, having left the EU as a member,  it would still enjoy the benefits of membership of the EU Single Market, and Customs Union. Some in the European Parliament have said the longest Transition the UK might be granted is 3 years.

If this is conceded, the U K, for the duration of the Transition, would not then have any say in the making, and in the interpretation of the rules of the Single Market and Customs Union, with which it would have to comply. It would still be subject to ECJ jurisdiction, and would still be contributing to the EU budget, on the same basis as if it was a member.

The UK Prime Minister calls this proposed transition period an” implementation” period.

Businesses in the UK and in the EU, and particularly Irish businesses trading with the UK, would presumably be expected to be implementing changes in their business practice to accommodate themselves to the sort of arrangements that would apply, in March 2021, when the UK had actually left both the Single Market and Customs Union, as Mrs May desires.

The difficulty will be that no one would know for sure what to prepare for.

The Transition would be more of a Postponement than a Transition!

This is because the  EU and the UK could only start substantive negotiations of the terms of a future UK/EU trade deal at the beginning of transition period, because the UK must first become a non member of the EU, before it can negotiate a trade deal with the EU.

On the other hand, as a non member and during the Transition Period, the UK would also have to negotiate replacements for the hundreds of  Trade and other Agreements it has with third countries as an EU member, which would cease once the UK had left the EU, on 29 March 2019.

Negotiating the terms of a Transition Period may prove to be very difficult, almost as difficult as negotiating a final agreement. Perhaps more, because there is no precedent to follow.

Of course, the political outlines of a  possible trade arrangement with the UK might have with the EU would be referred to in the “Framework for a future relationship” that, under Article 50, should accompany the Withdrawal Treaty.

The Withdrawal Treaty itself, and presumably the Framework, can be agreed by a qualified majority in the European Council.

But a future trade deal with the UK would face more difficulty. Depending on its content, and whenever it is eventually finalised, it  will  almost certainly require the  unanimous agreement.

If it covered services, many of which are regulated at national as well as EU level and which the UK wants included, it would have to get ratification from all the national parliaments.

So any outline of the trade deal, promised in the Framework accompanying the Withdrawal Treaty, might not survive the substantive negotiation that would take place after the UK had already left the EU

The Framework to be full of good intentions, but not full of the sort of bankable legal commitments that businesses will need to make investment decisions.

So two years may be too short a Transition period for business.

It will also be too short for trade negotiators, who say that a deal as complex, as the one the UK is seeking, would probably take 6 years to finalise, not just 2.

But, politically, a two year Transition, may be as long as the UK can live with, because its government is in such a political rush to leave.

By the time of the next election, the Conservative Party will not be comfortable ,if the UK is still in “transition”, implementing EU laws, contributing to the EU budget, and under the jurisdiction of the ECJ.  So it may be willing to pay a high price to finalise a Framework deal and end the Transition within the two years.

On the other hand, the likelihood is that, in those negotiating circumstances, the deal will be a “bad one” for the UK. But rejecting that “bad” deal will  not be attractive either because without a deal, the UK will be out of the EU, and will only be able to trade with the EU on “WTO terms”, which would be really bad for the UK, and appalling for Ireland.

All of this will be happening on the eve of the UK’s 2022 General Election.

In these circumstance the UK government might be tempted to look for an extension of the two years  Transiion and leave it to a post General election government to take the blame for an unsatisfactory Trade Agreement.

I believe one such time limited prolongation of the Transition Period, if requested by the UK, would be granted by the EU 27. But that would be it.

An indefinite prolongation, or a series of prolongations, would not be offered.

There is so much uncertainty surrounding the content and timeline of a UK/EU Trade deal that the Transition Period will not provide a reliable basis for planning by business.

All the same, the longer is the Transition, the better it will be for Irish business.

But a long Transition will be exceptionally difficult to sell in the UK.

It would offend against the principle of democratic representation. The UK would have to implement and abide by EU regulations, in the making of which it would have had no part. It would have no representation in the European Parliament,  Council or Commission. Any financial contribution it might make during the Transition would be represented by some as “taxation without representation”.

So, I conclude that, as the UK explores the difficulties of its proposed Transition or Implementation Period, it may find itself forced to look at other options.

The only other option on offer is an extension of time under Article 50 (3)

EXTENDING THE TWO YEARS AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 50

Article 50 (3) of the Treaties, under which UK withdrawal is being negotiated, says a country that has applied to withdraw from the EU and given notice of intention to do so under Article 50 (2) shall cease automatically to be a  member

“ two years after the notification referred to in paragraph (2), unless the European Council, in agreement with the member states concerned, unanimously decides to extend that period”.

Extending the two year period is a matter for the member states. There is no provision requiring the consent of the European Parliament to such an extension of the two years.

At the moment, there is no official sign that either the UK, or the EU 27, would contemplate using such an extension, or even talking about it.

It is too early. To do so would signal weakness, and would be a poor negotiating tactic.

But the provision for an extension of the two years was put there for a practical reason.

Even with the best will in the world, trade negotiations can take longer that all sides want.

There can be unexpected technical and legal difficulties.

General Elections and government formation delay can prevent decisions from being taken. Look at the example of Germany at the moment.

Rigid time limits can also be exploited by forces that have another agenda, and simply want to maximise chaos.

Politicians can even change their minds, but need more time, than is provided with in the two year limit, to adjust the expectations of their supporters.

Time limits create a fevered atmosphere in which rational calculation becomes more difficult.

Time will have to allowed, at the end of the  two year period, for ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement, and of the Framework for Future Relations by both the British and European Parliaments, and both may look for time for debate and deliberation on the merits of rejecting, or accepting, the proposed Treaty

. Neither Parliament may wish to be confronted with a proposition, which says “take it or leave it, and do so now”.

Allowing time for Parliamentary ratification , on its own, might necessitate an extension of the two years.

An extension of the two year period, under Article 50 (3) would be different, in its effect ,from an extension of the Transition period.

Under Article 50 (3), the UK would continue, for the duration of the extension, to be a full voting member of the EU, except on issues to do with Brexit.

It would still be a member of the ECJ and a British Judge would continue to sit there.

The UK member of the Commission would continue his important work in that capacity.

The UK MEPs would continue to sit in the European Parliament, although from 2019 there would be different MEPs from some of the constituencies.

The UK would continue to be bound by EU law, but that will also be case during a Transition. But in the Article 50(3) scenario, the UK would enjoy democratic representation.

In these senses, an extension under Article 50 (3) would be a better deal for the UK than a Transition Period.

But the Referendum decision to leave the EU would not yet have been implemented. It would still be under negotiation.

An extension of time under Article 50(3) offers a greater degree of certainty to business. The UK would definitely retain all the obligations and advantages of membership for the duration of the extension.

Article 50 (3) offers no guidance on, and does not limit, the period of an extension that could be granted. Nor does it place a limit on the number of extensions that might be granted.

Given that every EU state, and the UK itself, would have to agree, the likelihood is that the initial period of any extension could be quite short.

But if, during that extension, negotiations were going forward in a good and constructive spirit, further extensions could become possible

Under the Article 50 (3) approach, the UK would still be a member of the EU.

Thus, while it could agree a framework for its future relationship with the EU and this could cover trade matters, the UK could not negotiate and finalise a trade deal with the EU or anybody else.

That would be a big negative from the point of view of those in Britain who believe there are attractive trade deals waiting to be concluded.

But, on the other hand, the UK would continue to benefit from existing EU trade agreements, and the extra time would allow it to put much greater flesh  and detail into the Framework for Future Relations with the EU, than will be possible in the time between now and March 2019.

I believe the two year time limits has created a fevered atmosphere in the negotiations. It  has politicised them in a way that makes rational calculation of mutual interest more difficult.

An early agreement to a substantial extension under Article 50 (3) would remove this problem, and would give the negotiators more time and space.

I have the sense that some in the UK are open to this possibility, but there is little appetite for it in Brussels.

If the EU side were unilaterally to offer an extension of the time period, under Article 50 (3), that went beyond the time of the UK General Election, it would thereby place a heavier responsibility for a bad negotiating outcome on the current UK government.

The UK government might want to reject such an offer, but it might not be able to persuade the UK Parliament to agree.

This would not be easily done.

There is a feeling in some continental EU countries that the UK has already taken up too much of the EU’s time. For example, the David Cameron’s decision to prevent the Compact for the Fiscal governance of the Eurozone being incorporated in the EU Treaties, even though they had nothing to do with the UK, has left a very sour taste.

There is a fear that any extension of UK membership under Article 50 (3) could be exploited by the UK to block other EU reforms, and/or to improve the UK’s position in the competition between the EU and the UK post Brexit.

Granting the UK, which had decided to leave and chose the timing of its Article 50 letter freely, an extension of the time limit, would be seen by many as encouraging other sceptical EU states to use the threat of withdrawal as a bargaining tactic, or a means of getting votes in Elections.

In this context, taking a tough line with the UK is not seen as “punishment” of the UK, as much as being “self preservation” by the EU.

An extension of time under Article 50 (3) would mean that UK MEP’s would still be eligible to sit in the next European Parliament, at least until the extension period had expired and the UK was out.

A European Parliament Election in 2019 in the UK would allow the British people to debate the issue of UK withdrawal from the EU in a much more informed manner than was possible in the Referendum of 2016. The campaign, and the result, of the European Parliament in the UK in 2019 would give valuable guidance to negotiators.

It might confirm the decision to leave, or it might signal a willingness to change course.

Either way, under the Article 50(3) time extension scenario, this would happen before the UK had actually left the EU. So the outcome of a European Parliament Election, in the UK in 2019, would be politically meaningful.

If the result was decisive vote in favour of Remain candidates, the UK might have the option of withdrawing its Article 50 letter and staying on in the EU, under existing terms.

An extension of time under Article 50 (3) would facilitate a second Referendum, if that is what the British people want.

The choice would be much clearer than it was in 2016, because Britain would still be in the EU at the time of the Referendum. So staying in the EU in existing terms would be the clear alternative to accepting the Withdrawal Treaty and accompanying Framework document that would be presented in the Referendum.

Reapplying to join under Article 49, which would be the only option if the change of heart took place after the UK had already left the EU would be much more difficult. It would mean a whole new negotiation and different, and less favourable terms of membership, for the UK.

On the negative side, UK MEPs continuing in the European Parliament after the 2019 Election could play the role of spoilers. They could ally themselves with nationalistic and anti system MEPs from other countries, who simply do not want the EU to succeed.

A disadvantage of a time extension under Article 50 (3) is that it would interfere with the plans of a number of European leaders, including the Taoiseach and President Macron, to allocate some of the seats to be vacated by UK MEPs, to MEPs who would be elected from a constituency of the entire European Union. In the European Parliament itself, work is already being done on the allocation of the vacated UK seats, and some existing member states could get more seats. Beneficiaries might be inclined to resist an extension of time under Article 50 (3), but the European Parliament’s consent is not required. But keeping the UK in the EU is more important.

CONCLUSION

If an individual wants to withdraw from a contract, he can do so, but he would normally expect to have to compensate other parties to the contract for the damage his decision might cause. No consideration at all was given, during the referendum in 2016, to the impact, UK withdrawal would have on other contracting parties, notably on Ireland.

For all these reasons, I believe the UK, and the EU 27, need to take time out to think about where we are going with Brexit. Two years is not enough.

The confrontational atmosphere, engendered by the artificial time limits in Article 50, prevents a quiet discernment of mutual interests. It imposes a dangerous straight jacket.

As I have shown there are advantages but also profound difficulties, with all the options I have considered.

But, on balance, I believe the best way to reach a sensible outcome in the negotiation, that will do least damage to the political and economic relations between the UK and the rest of Europe, would be to forget about the Transition option, and agree a time extension under Article 50 (3).

That may not seem politically feasible at this stage, but I believe it will be seen in a different light by next October.

As I said earlier, if the EU side were to offer such an extension, at a moment when the full difficulty of the Transition option was becoming clear, it would change the dynamic in British politics.

If it rejected the time extension option in favour of the Transition option, the UK government itself would have to take the full responsibility

  • for entering what some Brexiteers have described as “Vassal status”,
  • for implementing rules they had  no say in making, and
  • for entering a period in which the UK would paying into EU funds, with no say in how the money was spent.

The rush for an early Brexit, that motivated Mrs May to write her Article 50 letter before her government had done its homework, was driven by a deep fear among the architects of Brexit that, if they did not leave quickly, they, or their voters, might change their mind about leaving at all.

This is, quite literally, an irrational basis for deciding the future of Britain.

It is a deeply dangerous basis on which Britain would impose the costs of its mistakes on Ireland.

It will leave deep and lasting scars.

I believe that an extension of time under Article 50 (3) of the Treaty is the best way to minimise, and possibly to eliminate, the damage.

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Speech by John Bruton, former Taoiseach and former EU Ambassador to the United States, speaking at the Skoda  Fleet Business event at 8 am on Monday 29th January in Bellinter House Hotel, Navan Co Meath;

 

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COMPETITION IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC…..A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE?

“Asia’s Reckoning, the Struggle for Global Dominance” by Richard McGregor certainly has an ambitious title.

It chronicles the growing competition in East Asia between China on one side, and the United States and Japan on the other. This competition has economic, military, and resource dimensions.

China aims to again become the dominant power in East Asia, a position which it had until about 200 years ago. Until then, other Asian countries acknowledged the preeminent position of the Chinese Emperor.  This history partly explains why China still has such  seemingly extravagant ideas about how far Chinese territorial waters extend.

Since 1945, through its network of alliances and military bases, the United States has held the position of dominant power in East Asia and in the western Pacific. But its hold is weakening, especially since both Trump and Clinton foolishly decided the United States should pull out of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would have provided an economic and trade under pinning to the US military position.

The United States position needed the economic strengthening TPP would have given it, because of dramatic changes that have occurred in relative economic power since 1990.

Since 1990,

  • the Chinese economy has increased thirty times in size, whereas
  • the US economy has only tripled in size. Meanwhile
  • the Japanese economy has only grown by 23%!

Countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Phillipines, depend on US military guarantees to defend their territorial integrity. Communist Vietnam has also moved closer to the United States for this reason. This worked well when US global dominance was visible for all to see, as it was in the wake of the first Gulf War. But subsequent US military reverses, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and isolationist rhetoric from President Trump has created new doubts.

While China has settled land based territorial disputes it had with its neighbours, highly emotional and unresolved issues remain with Japan, the Philipines, and Vietnam about uninhabited islands,  territorial waters, and exclusive air space. And, of course, China claims Taiwan.

China takes these issues very seriously.

For example, in 2012, Japan had 50 coast guard vessels to China’s 40. Now China has 120, to Japan’s 60.

Economic growth has enabled China to invest heavily in its military and naval strength.

China may not be seeking global dominance, as this book’s title suggests, but it is determined never again to be dominated by outside powers, as it was between the 1830’s and 1945. Memories of these past humiliations are fresh in China, and are reinforced by propaganda.

It growing economic and military power has increased China’s diplomatic weight.

The opening by South Korea to North Korea around the winter games may well be an example of Chinese influence replacing the belligerence of Donald Trump.

As time goes by, the United States will find its dominance of the western Pacific harder to maintain, but this may not lead to military conflict.

Thanks to its one child policy, quite soon, China will become an elderly country. Japan is already elderly. Elderly countries are prone to be cautious.

On the other hand, as this book laboriously demonstrates, both China and Japan have become increasingly nationalistic. They have radically different understandings of history, and this shapes their sense of what is important, and of who they are. Accidents and miscalculations can lead to war, as happened in Europe in 1914.

This book gives a detailed account of the twists and turns on the triangular diplomatic relationships of the United States, China and Japan since 1951. Some of this is hard to follow.

It does not deal with economics at all, so the reasons for Japan’s decline are unexplored. Shifts in United States perceptions of Asia are also largely unexplained.

This book deals with an important topic, but it could be better.

 

 

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LORD EDWARD FITZGERALD

Over Christmas, I greatly enjoyed reading “Citizen Lord, Edward Fitzgerald 1763-1798” by Stella Tillyard.

Lord Edward Fitzgerald was one of the leaders of the 1798 Rebellion in Ireland. He was arrested and fatally wounded before the rebellion got fully underway, but he had done much of the ground work and planning for it.

Early in his life he became alienated from his father, the Duke of Leinster.

He was very close to his mother, who ensured that he, and his siblings, were educated in accordance with the principles of Rousseau. Much of the material in the book comes from letters he wrote to his mother. Later, he was inspired in a revolutionary direction  by the ideas of Thomas Paine, author of the “Rights of Man”.

For someone who was dead by the age of 35, Lord Edward led a very varied life.

A younger son of the Duke of Leinster, he joined the Army as many younger sons of aristocratic families had to do. He had some land at Kilrush Co Kildare but not enough to support an aristocratic life style.

He fought on the British side in the American War of Independence and this meant that he was one of the few 1798 leaders who actually had some prior military experience.

He was wounded at the battle of Eutaw Creek in South Carolina in 1781, one of the last battles of the war, and his life was saved by a young African American, who subsequently became his employee and friend, who eventually accompanied him back to Ireland. The two of them subsequently trekked across North America from Nova Scotia to New Orleans.

Like many on the Whig or Liberal side of UK politics, he initially supported the French Revolution. Most of these initial supporters moved away from it as a result of the execution of the King, the Reign of Terror, and French military advances into neighbouring countries. Not Edward Fitzgerald.

He even went to Paris in 1792 to observe the Revolution, and it was there that he had his first conversations with Henry Sheares about the possibility of bringing the Revolution to Ireland.

Although this is an excellent book, it does not fully explain the progression of thought which led a leading aristocrat, like Edward Fitzgerald, to become a violent revolutionary. Clearly, for him, the power of ideas over rode economic and class interests.

Another aspect of the 1798 Rebellion, not within the scope of this book, is why so many Catholic priests became involved in a Rebellion in Ireland in 1798, in support of the French Revolution, notwithstanding the fact that French Revolutionaries had suppressed Catholic religious practice and, in 1796, put down a pro Catholic Rebellion in the Vendee with exceptional brutality.

Tillyard’s book is exceptionally readable and illuminates the subject’s personal, as well as his political, life. I recommend it.

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PADDY HARTE RIP

 

I wish to pay tribute to the life and political career of Paddy Harte.

Paddy was first elected to the Dail in 1961 and quickly earned a reputation as an original, independent minded, individual who thought for himself about the political questions of the day.

He was supportive of the late Declan Costello in promoting the ideas in the 1965 “Just Society” document, notably on social capital investment.

He was a resolute opponent of republican political violence. Working with Glenn Barr, he sought reconciliation between Nationalists and Unionists on the island, notably through the joint commemoration of the sacrifices both communities made during the First World War. This was often a lonely path for him to follow, and he showed great physical and moral courage.

Statement by John Bruton, former Taoiseach

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Radio Interview with Sean O’Rourke


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PETER SUTHERLAND RIP

Peter Sutherland was a brave and highly competent Attorney General of Ireland.

He remained committed to this country and helped Irish causes through his exceptional generosity.

In 1984, he was appointed to the European Commission.

Peter was especially proud of his initiative in setting up the Erasmus Student Exchange programme, which has had a profound and beneficial effect on the lives of hundreds of thousands of young Europeans.

In the wake of the passage of the Single European Act, which allowed majority voting on measures needed to establish the EU Single Market. As Commissioner, he negotiated a new legislative procedure which allowed for this and enhanced the role of the European Parliament.

As Competition Commissioner, he was aggressive in pursuing cases of unfair state aid, an activity which sometimes brought him into conflict with the Commission President, Jacques Delors, with President Mitterand and with Mrs. Thatcher. He was unafraid and stood his ground, and vindicated the independence of the Commission.

His most remarkable achievement was, as Director General of the GATT in getting the agreement, at a meeting of 160 nations in Marrakesh in 1994, to the establishment of the WTO.

The WTO established supranational panels to arbitrate trade disputes. It built the foundation for the building of a rules-based international order, in international trade, which has contributed to a quarter century of global prosperity, because the rules protected the weak as well as the strong.

This concern to protect the weak inspired his work for asylum seekers and refugees in more recent times.

He was a man of faith, who showed, through his life, that faith and modernity can be reconciled. His talents brought him great success, but he was always conscious of his responsibility to help others and give back to society.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN EUROPE 1453 TO THE PRESENT

I recently greatly enjoyed reading “Europe, the Struggle for Supremacy 1453 to the Present” by Brendan Simms.

He writes from a perspective that sees continuing conflict as the determining force in European politics. Military and strategic considerations are paramount.

This emphasis would not be shared by all historians. Peter Wilson’s “The Holy Roman Empire, a thousand years of European history” lays stress, instead. on a long surviving effort to build a European  legal order, that curbed and contained conflicts, under a shared allegiance to an elected Emperor and to a commonly accepted set of mutual expectations. This thousand year old arrangement only ended in 1806, after 1000 years.

Indeed, Simms own book throws light on later attempts to reconstitute a common European Home with common European set of house rules.

In the 1920s, the French leader Aristide Briand was prepared to trade French sovereignty for permanent restraints on German power. The UK stood aside from this because it relied instead on guaranteed of military support for its position from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada at the Imperial Conference of 1925. Although the Irish Free State was at that Conference, it offered no similar guarantee.

After the Second World War, a meeting, chaired by Winston Churchill, took place in the Hague in 1948 in a second attempt to build a structure for unity in Europe and avoid another war.

It could not agree on a model for European unity. Most countries were prepared to pool some sovereign powers, but the UK insisted that it would only work on an intergovernmental basis, which maximised its freedom of action. Even when it eventually joined the European Common Market, which did contain some sharing of sovereignty, UK politicians, and public opinion continued to see “Europe” as something apart from the UK, with which the UK would do business on a transactional case by case basis. Therein lay the seeds of Brexit.

In their hearts, many English people never joined the European Union at all.

While Simms may over emphasise the geostrategic conflicts in and around Europe, others ignore these at their peril.

Russian pressure on the Baltic States and Ukraine harks back to conflicts that last came to the surface at the end of the First World War. Rumania feels threatened by Russian pressure in Moldova, which was occupied by Stalin in 1940 under cover of his pact with Hitler.

I do not think there is a true European Union consensus on how to deal with any escalation of these types of conflicts, notwithstanding the mutual defence assurances NATO members have given one another. There is still an implicit reliance on the United States to save Europe.

But, unless there is a crisis, European defence policy will evolve very slowly.

The EU is not a state and is not about to become one. It is, instead, a habit of consultation and common action between states, underpinned by legal and institutional arrangements that are evolving in response to needs as they arise.

Ireland will remain within that structure with some influence on its evolution. The UK is turning aside, which is unfortunate because the security of much of Ireland’s infrastructure is dependent on links through the UK and its territorial waters. The sea is not the barrier to interference by hostile forces that it was in 1939. Increased interdependence has brought  increased vulnerability

Brendan Simms writes very well and there is new insight or angle on European history to be found on every second page.

I recommend this book, and also Peter Wilson’s book too (although I am only a quarter way through it!).

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MANY CONTRADICTIONS REMAIN IN BREXIT AGENDA

The United Kingdom Cabinet is, at last, getting around to discussing the sort of trade agreement it wants to have with the EU after it has left.

It intends to make up its mind by mid January, according to the Sun newspaper.  

The UK Prime Minister has ruled out staying on in the EU Customs Union (like Turkey) or in the Single Market (like Norway).

Although she has ruled out these “soft Brexit” options, Mrs. May has gone much further.

She has committed, in the Joint Report of EU/UK negotiations to “the avoidance of a hard border, including any infrastructure or related checks and controls” at the border in Ireland, and also to protect Northern Ireland’s place in the UK internal market.

Customs checks exist at the EU border with both Turkey and Norway, so Mrs. May’s promise in the Joint Report goes beyond either the Turkish or Norwegian options.

It is noteworthy that the UK has not just said that it will not, itself, ever erect a hard border on its own side.  It has committed itself to the “avoidance” of such a border, presumably on either side. That would mean that the UK has bound itself not to adopt any UK policies that would require the EU, under its existing rules, to impose such border controls.

That would rule out devising new and distinctive UK product standards, which Boris Johnson suggested over the weekend. It would also rule out Philip Hammond’s idea of the UK diverging from EU rules on certain technologies.  

HOW WILL INTEGRITY OF EU MARKET BE PRESERVED WITHOUT BORDER CONTROLS?

After Brexit, Ireland will remain a member of the EU Customs Union.

There will be no customs controls between this state and the rest of the EU, at Zeebrugge or le Havre or anywhere else. So where will the customs controls be?

As a member of the Customs Union, Ireland will remain bound by the terms of the EU Customs Code.

The EU Customs Code was agreed in 1992, when the UK was a member of the EU, and the UK will have been fully aware, from the outset, of the obligations of EU member states under it.

Article 2(1) of the Customs Code says it shall “apply uniformly throughout the Community”.

This would seem to imply that it applies right up to the Irish border on this side, unless there is a derogation for Ireland, or the UK agrees, as a non member, to apply the EU Customs Code in its jurisdiction too.

It would be difficult for the UK to reconcile doing this, with the rhetoric used in the Referendum about the UK “taking back control”.

The Customs Code is quite strict. For example, it mandates  “customs offices of entry” at which documents may be lodged, opportunities for collecting information for risk management by the Customs, opportunities to check compliance with rules of origin, and provisions for the unloading of goods to check contents and take samples.

If the UK is to keep its promise not to do things, that would necessitate such controls at either side the Irish border, it will constrain itself in ways for which UK public opinion, and both Boris Johnson and Philip Hammond, are not yet be prepared.

In preparing its proposed framework for a new UK relationship with the EU, the UK will also need to take account of the constraints under which the EU operates, in its relations with third countries.

UK WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF SWISS AND NORWEGIAN PRECEDENTS

The EU would have difficulty offering the UK better terms than it would offer another European country.

For example, Norway and Switzerland have access to the EU market.  They also make ongoing financial contributions every year to poorer regions within the EU.  Those agreements with Norway and Switzerland would be undermined, if UK got a similar deal, without similar contributions.

Furthermore, any EU/UK deal will have to comply with the Interlaken principles.

These principles govern all EU agreements with third countries and were formulated in 1978, with UK participation.  They have been followed ever since.

The first Interlaken principle is that, in developing relations with non-member states, the EU will always prioritise its own internal integration. The UK cannot expect the EU to agree to anything that would cause divisions within the EU.

The second Interlaken principle is that the EU must safeguard its own decision-making autonomy. For example, the European Court of Justice, and the legislative bodies of the EU, cannot be constrained in their decision making processes by any deal made with the UK.  The idea that a joint UK/EU court might have precedence over the ECJ would run counter to this principle.

The third Interlaken principle is that any relationship must be based on “a balance of benefits and obligations”. It is not for the non-member state to choose only those aspects of EU integration it likes.

WTO RULES WILL APPLY

There is another factor the UK will need to take into account. This is the “Most Favoured Nation Principle” of the WTO, which is the foundation stone for global trade.

It requires the extension, to ALL members of the WTO, of any “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” that is offered to one.

Cherry picking in international trade could get the UK into trouble with all the countries with which it does business.

Formulating a UK proposal, which satisfies all these conflicting criteria, will be hugely demanding task, not only politically, but intellectually and legally.

“Taking back control” and  “no hard border” are hard to reconcile, to put it mildly.

The dilemma, in which the UK in which now finds itself, may be self created, but it is real.  Irish people should wish Teresa May well, in her immensely difficult task.

Her political weakness helps her move things forward, in the short term, but it makes it harder for her to make a permanent deal that will endure in face of the disappointed expectations of those who voted for Brexit.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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The EU vote ignored Ireland, but the UK can still change its mind

Let me first try to explain why the handling of Brexit by the UK led to a crisis in Anglo-Irish relations. Treaties between nations are like contracts between individuals. They influence how each party behaves, towards one another and towards the rest of the world. While a contract or a treaty can be withdrawn from, there is a legitimate expectation that this will only be done with careful advance consideration of how this will affect the other parties to the treaty or contract. This is not just a legal expectation, but an expectation of the sort of civility that should apply in relations between people and nations.

One also takes for granted that, if the withdrawing party to a contract wants a new or different contract with the same parties, it will say in advance what it wants that new relationship to be. Even now, Ireland has no clear idea what sort of relationship, compatible with the EU rules the UK helped make, the UK wants with the EU, and hence with Ireland. As the country most affected by Brexit, there is thus deep disappointment in Ireland that our neighbour the UK has not been able, in respect of Brexit, to live up to the normal expectations I have just outlined.

Forty-four years ago, Ireland and the UK signed the same contract with one another, and with the seven other countries that then made up the European Common Market. We each renewed that contract several times, in the UK’s case with the sovereign approval of its parliament. We each expected that the others would continue to honour the contract and we shaped our institutions and our economies on that basis. In particular, when Ireland and the United Kingdom negotiated the Belfast and St Andrews Agreements, to resolve the ongoing conflicts in and around Northern Ireland, we each did so on the unquestioned assumption that the UK would continue to be an EU member.

We each assumed that the freedoms created by membership of the EU could continue to be used to strengthen relations between the two communities in Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between Ireland and Britain.

The renegotiation and referendum process that was initiated by David Cameron, which has led to Brexit, seemed to us in Ireland to have been designed in a way that took no account of the obligations and expectations the UK had created in Belfast and at St Andrews.

During the renegotiation phase, the Irish taoiseach, Enda Kenny, supported Cameron’s attempt to improve the special status the UK already had in the EU, even though some of the concessions the UK were given weren’t in Ireland’s interest.

Irish people saw other problems with the process that led to Brexit. The complex UK/EU relationship was reduced to a simple “Leave” or “Remain” choice. While it was clear what “Remain” meant, no effort at all was made by the government sponsoring the referendum to say what sort of “Leave” it would choose. So “Leave” became a vehicle for fantasies and wishful thinking of the most egregious kind. Explanations of the choices between different forms of Brexit – such as on whether to stay in the customs union and the single market – were left over until the people had already voted.

There was no deliberative process to inform public opinion, something one would have expected of the UK parliament, one of the oldest democratic deliberative bodies in the world. The referendum was not preceded by detailed green and white papers. In the absence of authoritative information, there was no informed debate about the impact of Brexit on the Irish border, and on hundreds of issues.

It is only in the past week that the UK government has started to consider the sort of post-Brexit relationship it will ask for. In doing so, it will have to take account of the fact that the EU works because it is a single legal order, with a single system that makes, implements and adjudicates on the meaning of shared EU rules. The UK has a sovereign right to decide what it would like, but it cannot expect the EU to change its very nature, just to accommodate a country that is leaving.

In preparing its proposal, the UK will need to take into account the Interlaken principles that govern EU relations with third countries, and the EU community customs code, both of which UK ministers helped to draft. When it has done this, the UK government can then compare the special position it already enjoys as a voting EU member, with what the EU will be in a position to offer it as a non-member. Then it can make an informed decision. We are each allowed to change our minds in our private lives if the issue is important enough. Nations might sometimes allow themselves the same privilege.

Opinion @ The Guardian by John Bruton

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“El Reino Unido ha puesto a Irlanda en una situación casi imposible”

El Mundo correspondent, Carlos Freneda, interviewed John Bruton for Spanish Newspaper. 

“El Brexit dañará más a la economía irlandesa que a la británica”, afirma el ex primer ministro irlandés John Bruton

Londres abonará entre 45.000 y 55.000 millones de euros como factura por el Brexit

John Bruton (Dunboyne, 1947) fue primer ministro irlandés en los “felices” 90: del mercado único que suprimió las barreras físicas entre las dos Irlandas, al Acuerdo del Viernes Santo que allanó el camino al proceso de paz. Bruton advierte ahora que los avances logrados en los últimos veinte años pueden saltar por los aires con el Brexit, que tendrá un mayor impacto económico y social en la vecina Irlanda que en el propio Reino Unido.

¿Hay alguna manera de soluciona el “problema irlandés”? ¿Se puede quedar una parte de isla dentro de la UE y la otra fuera?
El obstáculo está en la mente cerrada de la facción pro-Brexit del Partido Conservador. No entienden que los mercados abiertos requieren normas comunes, decididas democráticamente entre los países e interpretadas de un modo uniforme. Eso es lo que facilita la UE. La permanencia en el mercado único y en la unión aduanera podría ser una solución, pero los brexiteros (y los unionistas) no ven nigún valor en ello… El Reino Unido ha puesto a Irlanda en una posición casi imposible, tanto para preservar el proceso de paz como para asegurar el libre comercio entre las dos partes de la isla. Una vuelta a la frontera dura seriviría para aislar los nacionalistas del norte de una manera peligrosa… El Brexit dañará potencialmente más a la economía irlandesa que a la británica. El Reino Unido puede haber votado a favor de este acto de autolesión económica, pero los ciudadanos de la República de Irlanda no han votado, y los de Irlanda del Norte han votado por la permanencia.
El Gobierno británico ha llegado a sugerir una frontera “virtual” y sin fricciones, sin necesidad de volver a instalar aduanas y con los últimos avances tecnológicos…
Eso no es posible. Dos terceras partes de los cargamentos que atravesarán la frontera tendrían que ser inspeccionados en algún lugar, y eso crearía poblemas.
Usted ha llegado a decir que Irlanda debe hacer cuanto esté en su mano para evitar el Brexit ¿Lo cree aún posible?
Lo que creo que debería hacerse en prolongar el tiempo límite que fija el Artículo 50 y tener un margen de dos a seis años para intentar resolver las complejidades a las que nos enfrentamos. Así se daría tiempo a los británicos para cambiar de opinión si lo consideran, y eso haría innecesario un acuerdo de transición. El Reino Unido debería seguir siendo un miembro con derecho a voto durante ese tiempo.
¿Qué pasaría en Irlanda si el Reino Unido opta por marcharse de un portazo y sin un acuerdo con la UE?
Eso sería desastroso para nosotros a medio plazo, y a largo plazo dañaría considerablemente las relaciones entre Irlanda y el Reino Unido. En ese caso, Irlanda tendería los puentes económicos y culturas hacia otros países como Francia y España, como ocurrió durante los conflictos del siglo XVI y XVII (en la batalla de Kinsale, sin ir más lejos).
¿Reconocerá el Reino Unido el daño que el Brexit puede causar a sus vecinos más próximos?
Hay muy pocas señales de que quieran reconocer el daño, o que les importe lo más mínimo. En lo único que piensan es en sí mismos y en “recuperar el control”. El Brexit es un proceso más “psicológico” que económico, sobre el papel de Inglaterra en el mundo. No olvidemos que el Reino Unido es una idea puesta en marcha para asegurar y preservar los intereses estratégicos y militares de Inglaterra.
¿Qué sectores de la economía irlandesa se verían afectados por el Brexit?
El sector manufacturero sobre todo: las mercancías que no pueden ser transportadas fácilmente por avión para evitar el Reino Unido. Y también la producción de carne y de lana. La agricultura sufriría mucho si tenemos normas distintas en el norte y en el sur. El sector energético lo notará también.
¿Piensa que el Brexit puede en última instancia dar impulso a la unificación de Irlanda?
El principal obstáculo a la unificación es la hostilidad por una parte muy importante de la población en Irlanda del Norte. Las actividades en el pasado del IRA y el papel que juega ahora Sinn Féin refuerza esa falta de voluntad. Tampoco creo que la población en la República de Irlanda esté dispuesta a aceptar el peso de forzar a un millón de personas a integrarse contra su voluntad en una Irlanda unida. El coste no sería solo económico, sino en términos de sociales y de sectarismo. Por supuesto que habría mucho menos problemas si ese millón de personas cambiara de opinión, pero hay pocas señales de que eso sea posible.
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