Category: Germany (Page 2 of 2)
- whether to include countries not yet in the euro
- whether to bring all banks under direct EU supervision, or just the big ones
- the scope of an EU wide deposit guarantee, as to the amount covered and whether there would have to a local contribution, without which the system might be abused
- an EU wide system for closing banks down and distributing the losses between shareholders, different classes of creditors, taxpayers and other banks in the country in question and elsewhere. Associated with this is the question of requiring all banks to draw up “living wills” to say what would happen if they go out of business
- Some form of limited euro zone wide taxing capacity to act as a back stop if the deposit guarantee fund proves insufficient.
- how to distinguish between past, and potential future liabilities
- the proper focus of euro zone bank supervision. Should it be on capital ratios, liquidity ratios, business models, diversification or other variables? Should different types of banking be separated from one another, or does a mixed system make it easier to get over short term difficulties?
- what to do about Britain, which wants nothing to do with the euro or a a European Banking Union, but still wants unfettered access to euro zone financial markets on the same terms as everyone else.
But Germany is being blamed for the unwillingness of the EU and the IMF to sign off on this second bailout , without , what some Greeks see as, humiliatingly detailed assurances that
- the money will be used properly ,
- Greece will adopt specified policies to cut back state spending and raise taxes and that it will
- liberalise its economy, so that it can grow fast enough to be able to repay the extra money it is now to be lent.
The trouble is that Greece has a poor record in presenting honest accounts, and in implementing in practice, changes it has agreed to in principle. The extra assurances are being sought so that more good money is not poured down a black hole along with the debts that are now being partially written off.
Without this loan, Greece would default and it would leave the euro.
In fact, what Germany is really doing is defending the interests of savers, including Greek savers, from what would happen, if Greece defaulted and left the euro. If Greece left the euro, its banks would collapse, and Greeks would see their savings, whether in the form of bank deposit accounts, life assurance policies, or claims on pension funds, disappear.
THE CHOICE FOR GREECE IS BETWEEN PLANNED AUSTERITY, AND SUDDEN INDISCRIMINATE, AUSTERITY
Some argue that “austerity” is a mistake, because the cuts in spending and tax increases dampen confidence so much that the economy stops growing. In the short term, this is true. But those who criticise on that basis, have no realistic alternatives to offer.
Where can Greece get the money on better terms than it is getting from the EU/IMF?
There really is no Keynesian alternative for Greece. The Greek economy is too elderly, too inward looking and too riddled with restrictive practices, to benefit from a Keynesian stimulus, even if someone could be found to finance it. Greece must modernise first. The EU/IMF programme gives it some breathing space (perhaps too little) in which to do that.
Keynesian economics might have been relevant in the 1930s, when the European population was much younger and could respond to an economic stimulus. Europeans today are much older, many are retired, and their priority is saving for their old age, rather than going out shopping in response to a boost in government spending. It is not going to get easier. The age dependency ratio in the EU in 2007 was 25%, by 2050 it will be 50% ! What people are looking for now, is stability.
Greece faces an alternative of two forms of austerity
- austerity through planned cuts and tax increases under the EU/IMF programme or
- austerity through indiscriminate inflation, of the kind that would occur, if Greece left the euro and devalued.
But the price of this inflation/devaluation option would be high. If Greece left the euro, its banks would collapse and the savings of ordinary Greeks, who were patriotic enough to leave their money in Greek banks, would disappear. Inflation is hard to keep in check once it starts, and Greece also lacks big export industries ready to boost exports quickly on the back of a devaluation.
THE REAL POLITICAL DIVIDE………SAVERS VERSUS BORROWERS
It is true that current EU policies are favouring savers over borrowers. This is so because the ECB, unlike the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, is not willing to engage in “quantitative easing” ,printing money indiscriminately, to revive the economy temporarily.
It is between savers, who do not want their savings devalued or confiscated, and borrowers, who would like to be allowed to pay back less than they owe.
“ORDINARY PEOPLE”, SOMETIMES THE SAME PEOPLE, ARE ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS DIVIDE
But if borrowers pay back less than they owe, someone somewhere else has to take the hit.
If borrowers are helped by having their debts being written off, or having their debts are devalued by inflation, someone else will lose.
Who would lose?
- The losers would include taxpayers, who now own many of the banks, and who would see the value of those banks go down
- Other losers would be pension funds and insurance companies who own bank shares, and the people who rely on these pension funds and insurance companies to pay their pensions, or insure them against risk.
- Yet other losers would be the people who have deposits in banks, who would see the value of those deposits reduced by inflation, and who could even lose those deposits if the bank collapsed.
Greeks bashing Germans, or all of us bashing bankers, may give emotional satisfaction, but it will not pay our bills.