John Bruton

Opinions & Ideas

Category: BREXIT (Page 2 of 3)

TEARING UP 40 YEARS OF COMMON RULE MAKING…..THE MEANING OF THERESA MAY’S SPEECH

Once Theresa May said ,at her party Conference in Birmingham in October, that she was insisting on immigration controls, on rejecting the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and on making trade deals with non EU countries, a hard Brexit became inevitable.

MAY SAYS SHE WANTS A STRONG EU

She said in her recent speech that she wants the European Union to be strong and successful, without the UK.

It was important that she say that. It set a good tone and it differentiates her position from that of Donald Trump, who, like Vladimir Putin, wants the EU to break up.

Mrs May says she wants the EU to stay together, but for that to happen, there can be no question of a country, including her own, being offered better terms by the EU, for leaving the EU, than it would obtain if it stayed in the EU.

That is not “punishing” anybody, it is common sense.

Mrs May set out her goals, but not all the pitfalls on the way.

FINAL DEAL WILL HAVE TO BE RATIFIED BY THE PARLIAMENTS OF ALL EU STATES

The eventual Free Trade agreement she wants with EU will not be finalised in Brussels. It will have to be approved by the 27 or more Parliaments within the EU.  The difficulties Ukraine and Canada have had getting their Agreements approved show how unpredictable that may be. Convincing Michel Barnier to agree may be the least of the UK’s negotiating problems!

She said that, on leaving the EU, the UK will retain all the  then existing EU rules for goods and services, but will then change them, as necessary afterwards. This implies a gradual hardening of the border in Ireland, as UK standards begin to diverge from EU standards.

MORE BUREAUCRACY INEVITABLE

To the extent that the UK diverges from EU standards, the UK businesses will have to apply two sets of standards, one for the UK market, and another for the 45% of UK exports that go to the EU. More paperwork, not less!

Once the UK has left the EU, goods coming  into the EU (including into Ireland) from the UK will be subject to checking under “Rules of Origin” requirements, in other words to check that they do not contain an undue amount of content that is not from the UK at all, but from elsewhere.

For example, there will have to be checks that UK beef burgers do not contain Brazilian beef.  These “Rules of Origin” checks will involve a lot of delays, and yet more bureaucracy, which will be especially onerous for small firms.

One study estimated that the need to apply “Rules of Origin” checks could reduce trade volumes by 9%.

PROBLEMS FOR RETAILERS

The UK decision to leave the Customs Union will create big problems for the Irish retail trade. Many retail chains treat Ireland as an extension of the UK retail market and have built their distribution chains, the network of warehouses, and their logistics on that basis.

Now transiting goods destined for Ireland through the UK, or from Ireland via the UK to continental Europe, will become much more complex. Customs inspections, paperwork and even road use costs may arise. These problems could be mitigated by new customs agreements, but this will not be easy. These problems will be particularly acute for food products, which are perishable.

New ways of getting goods in and out of Ireland, avoiding the UK , may have to be devised. Ireland will need to redirect its transport infrastructure towards the continent and away from UK routes which will require investment in new infrastructure at ports like Rosslare and Cork.

HALF IN, AND HALF OUT, OF THE CUSTOMS UNION?

Theresa May was remarkably unclear about the sort of relationship she wants with the EU Customs Union. She wants bits of it, but not all of it.

In attempting this unusual feat, she will run into difficulties with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a body of which the UK now wants to become a fully independent member.

The WTO works on the basis of non discrimination, or the so called “Most Favoured Nation” principle.

As I understand it, any concessions that the EU Customs Union grants to the UK, as a non EU member, would have to be extended to all the EU Customs Union’s trading partners, unless the concessions cover “substantially all” trade between the UK and the Customs Union.  If this is so, Theresa May’s formula will be unworkable. The UK will have to be either ” substantially in”, or “substantially out”, of the Customs Union.

Any concessions the UK might get to allow it to be partially in, or partially out, of the EU Customs Union for a given product or service, will have to be purchased at a price from the EU and from the other members of the WTO.  The whole process will be dragged out by other countries seeking an advantage in an apparently unrelated field.

It will drag on, and on.

HOW IRELAND SHOULD APPROACH THE BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THEY START

Theresa May’s commitment to the Common Travel Area (CTA) with Ireland is welcome, but the CTA is an understanding rather than an enforceable legal agreement. The extent to which it gives legally enforceable right to work in either jurisdiction will be tested in the negotiations. Spain will seek similar rights for Spanish workers working in Gibraltar.

How should Ireland approach the negotiation of UK exit from the EU?

Obviously, Ireland has more to lose in this than any other EU country.

But Ireland needs to be clear in its own mind that it is in the EU, and intends to stay there.

Ireland has  prospered in the EU, in a way it  did not prosper before it  joined and when it was dependent on the British market. Ireland has prospered thanks to foreign investment, which came to Ireland on the explicit assurance that Ireland would remain in the EU and that firms located in Ireland  would have full access to the EU single market.

Incidentally, the UK also did better economically in the 43 years since it joined the EU, than it did in the period before it did so.

There has been a lot of abstract commentary in the Irish media about the stance Ireland should take in the Brexit negotiations. Some have suggested that Ireland detach itself from the common EU negotiating stance. This would be a big mistake, because in trade negotiations size matters.

While the negotiations will be conducted by the European Commission, they will be intensely scrutinised at every meeting of the European Council, where Ireland will be represented by the Taoiseach. No move will be made without intense Irish involvement on the EU side.

Irish Embassies in every EU capital will be vigilant. Ireland will need to deepen its understanding of the fears and hopes of every one of its 26 EU partners, understand their history, and speak their languages. It is by framing Ireland’s goals in terms that the  other 26 can see is in their interests too, that Ireland will maximise its success in the Brexit negotiations.

As Brexit is a British initiative, it is proper that, as the first step, Britain should accompany its application to leave the EU, with a detailed prospectus setting out how its proposed relationship with the Customs Union might work, specifying how its proposals might be reconciled with WTO rules.

It is better that the UK identify any legal, practical , and logistical  difficulties, for itself and by itself.

In that way, it will own the problem, and own the solution.

It is not for the EU to tell the UK what to do, because that would just allow the UK to blame Brussels for the bad news, and blame others for problems that are INHERENT in what the UK itself is now looking for.

IN ANY NEGOTIATION, SIZE MATTERS

Of course, Ireland can continue to work with the UK on common problems. To the extent that bilateral discussions with the UK can smooth the overall path of the wider negotiations,  that would be welcomed by Ireland’s EU partners.

But Ireland would have to be entirely transparent with its EU partners in regard to any discussions it might have with the UK, on any subject that was part of the overall EU/ UK negotiations. That is vital.

On issues of importance to Ireland, the extra leverage Ireland will have, as a member of the EU team, will help Ireland get a much better deal than it could ever get, as a smaller country negotiating on its own, with a much bigger UK.

In any negotiation, size matters!

IRELAND MUST BECOME HYPER COMPETITIVE

Now that it is clear that we have to prepare for a hard Brexit, Ireland should adopt an aggressive strategy to improve its overall competitiveness.

That is how we will attract new business to Ireland, and withstand the destructive currency gyrations that unfortunately will be part of the Brexit process.

Ireland must become hyper competitive. The right action agenda for the government is to be found in the “Competitiveness Challenge”, presented to the government last month by the National Competitiveness Council.

In his foreword to the Report, the Taoiseach said “We need to continue our effort to control and reduce costs-whether for property, legal services, finance or energy”

As the Report points out, Ireland has the 5th highest productivity in the OECD, after Luxembourg, Norway, the US and Belgium. To overcome Brexit, we should aim now at first, not fifth, place on this table!

When the UK leaves the EU, we will still be competing with them, and they will be freed of the discipline of   EU state aid rules, and thus able, if they wish, to compete unfairly with us. Comparing Ireland with the UK, on the World Bank Rankings, the Competitiveness Council Report  says that,  for a business wanting to

+  get electricity, Ireland is in 33rd place, while the UK is in 17th place in the world

+  get a Construction permit, Ireland is in 38th place, while the UK is in 17th place

+  enforce a contract, Ireland is in 90th place in the world, while the UK is in 31st place (our case clearance rate in our courts is the worst in the EU)

+  trade across borders, Ireland is in 27th place, while the UK is in 13th place

+   get Credit, Ireland is in 32nd place , while the UK is in 20th place.

The remedy to each of these problems is different. It will usually involve action by several government Departments. So a “whole government” approach will be needed, with a narrow focus on dramatically improving Ireland’s competitiveness position in every area where our costs of doing business are too high.

The Taoiseach, and his office, are in an ideal position to drive this because he has unique authority to clear away road blocks caused by disputes between Departments.

PAY AND TAX POLICY MUST TAKE HARD BREXIT INTO ACCOUNT

 Making Ireland hyper competitive, so as to withstand a  hard Brexit, would provide a unifying agenda for the New Politics, going beyond the Programme for Partnership government, which after all agreed when Brexit  seemed unlikely.

If the national aim is to be hyper competitive, that must influence public sector pay claims. It strengthens the case for setting up a “Rainy Day Fund” to meet unexpected fiscal eventualities, and the case for a strong Independent Parliamentary Budget Office. We will not be able to afford to narrow our tax base. We should not spend today, what we are unsure we will actually earn tomorrow!

We will not be able to afford any work disincentives in our tax and income support systems, nor to have so many households where no one is working, an area where Ireland is worse than any other EU country.

The clarity we now have from Theresa May’s speech about the direction Brexit will take, is the signal we needed for a comprehensive plan to make the Irish economy hyper competitive, starting now, even before the UK writes its Article 50 letter.

 

WILL THE 1998 BELFAST AGREEMENT SURVIVE THE  UK GENERAL ELECTION OF 2020?

The Daily Telegraph today says that the UK Prime Minister intends to include in the 2020 Conservative Party General Election Manifesto a promise to pull the UK, including presumably Northern Ireland, out of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

According to the story, she does not intend to implement this promise until after the UK has left the EU, which she hopes to have achieved before the 2020 Election.

The existing corpus of ECHR law would apparently be incorporated into UK law, but there would no longer be a right of appeal to the European Court on Human Rights, only to the UK Supreme Court.

If implemented, this promise would appear to me to breach the terms of the Belfast Agreement of 1998, which is an international Agreement. On the strength of this international Agreement, Ireland amended its constitution. The Agreement was the fruit of years of work by successive Taoisigh and Prime Ministers.

There is no mention of the inter relationship of the ECHR and the Belfast Agreement, or of any negotiation on it with the parties to the Belfast Agreement, anywhere in the Daily Telegraph article. Yet the  appears to be the result of a very detailed briefing. A purely unilateral UK action seems to be what is envisaged, without reference to the parties, including Ireland.

Adherence to the European Convention by the Northern Ireland Administration, and therefore by the UK unless Northern Ireland’s status changes,  is built explicitly into the terms of the Belfast Agreement.

Paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c) of Strand One of the Agreement require all legislation passed by the Northern Ireland Assembly to adhere to the terms of the ECHR.

There are other references to the ECHR in other parts of the Agreement.

The ECHR is fundamental to all the human rights elements of the Belfast Agreement.

If the UK is no longer a party to ECHR, and no longer subject to the rulings on the European Court on Human Rights, there will no longer be any common basis, between Ireland and the UK, for settling any differences of interpretation that might arise between Ireland and the UK concerning human rights issues in Northern Ireland.

It is important to the sustainability of any international agreement, in this case one between Ireland and the UK, that there be a neutral referee in the case of disputes.

This neutral element was particularly important to nationalist opinion at the time of the finalisation of Agreement, and the referenda which approved it. It remains so to this day.

As far as any disputes might arise about human rights in Northern Ireland, that neutral referee is the European Court of Human Rights. But the UK Prime Minister now apparently intends unilaterally to withdraw Northern Ireland from the ECHR and its court.

I believe this is a very serious issue, and bodes ill for the future.

As a former Home Secretary, the current UK Prime Minister should be aware of the constitutional importance of the Belfast Agreement, and indeed of the referendums approving it, in both parts of Ireland, which ended an historic dispute, dating back a very long time indeed.

We can only ensure that we do not “return to the border of the past” if there is an appreciation at the highest level that party driven initiatives do not undermine hard won negotiated achievements.

 

NATIONALISM AND PERIPHERALITY…..TWO PROSPECTIVE LEGACIES OF BREXIT

bonnetThis long article by Andrew Duff, a former MEP, draws on the recent House of Lords reports on the subject, to illustrate how complicated the Brexit negotiations must inevitably become. 

After 40 years of interdependence and common rule making, the UK is now setting out to reconstruct the entire apparatus of a separate nation state, with separate rules, and separate rule making and  adjudication systems. This is how Theresa May has chosen to interpret the referendum result, by ruling out any jurisdiction of the ECJ.

A nation state apparatus, that would have sufficed in the 1960’s, will not suffice for the 2020’s, because the world is much more interdependent, more interconnected, and faster moving, now than it was then.

The exercise the UK is undertaking will involve establishing a new bureaucracy, to deal separately with all the regulatory questions that previously were delegated by it for collective decision within the EU. The EU superstructure will have to be replicated in London, at some cost.

The UK may want to develop separate standards for many goods and services, but, if it does so,  UK firms will have the extra cost of complying, not only with the new UK standards, but with EU standards as well for any goods and services they wish to export to the rest of Europe.

There will thus be duplication at firm level, as well as at government level.

The only way to minimise this would be to go for a “soft Brexit”, whereby the UK would adopt EU rules, but without having a vote on those rules.

Such an option may be sustainable business wise, but it will not be sustainable politically in the medium term.

It would represent a substantial diminution of UK “sovereignty” relative to the “sovereignty” the UK now has as a full EU member. This would soon become politically unacceptable to the British people.

One can easily imagine the anger of the “Daily Mail” about the UK having to enact, and enforce, EU standards, on which the UK had had no vote!  But that is what a soft Brexit would entail.

For these reasons, a “soft Brexit” will only be a temporary arrangement, and one should  not invest all ones hopes in it.

I am coming to the view, reluctantly, that the only viable long term options are either

  • a “hard Brexit” or
  • a decision by the voters of the UK to stay in the EU after all.

The latter seems very unlikely indeed at the moment, because UK voters will not want to admit they made a mistake. They have no sentimental attachment to Europe anyway and sentiment seems to trump economics in voter’s minds nowadays.

But that could change gradually.

British people are, many for the first time, now learning about what the EU really is.

At the best of times, British people were never very curious about the EU or how it worked. Now they are required to find out, as part of the exit negotiation. It will be something of a revelation!

For 40 years, UK voters have been passengers in the EU car. Now, having decided to get out of the car, they are taking a first look under the bonnet.

They will discover how interconnected the different parts of the engine are, and how difficult it would be to link into some, but not into all, parts of the engine.

The UK will have to build its own engine from scratch now, and decide in which direction it wants the new car to travel. There was no consensus at all on the latter point on the “Leave” side in the referendum. Some want a more globalised Britain, the majority wants the exact opposite.

Ireland will be a spectator in this process.

The physical isolation of Ireland from the rest of the EU, in the event of a hard Brexit, is a problem that will need much thought at EU level, in the interests of European solidarity.

Experts in logistics, transport and communications need to be brought together at EU level, to examine how the costs of this physical isolation of Ireland can be minimised.

Commisioner Verstager, who is responsible for EU competition policy, should look at what needs to be done to ensure that states that are physically isolated from the core of the EU, like Greece, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland,  can always participate on an equal basis in the internal market.

THE MECHANICS OF BREXIT AND ITS EFFECT ON IRELAND

 

cropped-irish-flag.jpgI am deeply honoured to have been invited to speak here today in the company of your President, John Comer, and of the Minister for Agriculture , Michael Creed.

I worked with the Minster’s father, Donal Creed, when Donal was spokesman on Agriculture for Fine Gael, and I was the then secretary of the Party’s Agriculture Committee. That was 1969, long before we joined the Common Market.

I remember many meetings with ICMSA at that time, and was always impressed by the seriousness and realism of the way in which your organisation represents its members and agriculture more generally. The fact that your President, John Comer, comes from Co Mayo is evidence of the broad national reach of ICMSA.

I have been asked to talk about Brexit. Everything I say will be a personal opinion, not representing anyone else.

Everyone would like to know what form Brexit will take, and how it will affect Irish farmers, and the rest of the country too. Unfortunately, it is next to impossible even to begin to answer that question until we first see what the UK will actually look for. Only then can we begin to speculate in an informed way about how the negotiation might go.

In what I say today, I will try to describe the mechanics of the three negotiations that will probably take place

  • the negotiation of a Withdrawal Treaty.
  • the negotiation of Treaty covering the Future Framework of relations between the EU and the UK and, possibly
  • the negotiation of an Interim Agreement, to apply after the UK has left the EU, but before a full Future Framework Treaty has been finalised and ratified

TWO NEGOTIATIONS….ONE ABOUT WITHDRAWING, THE OTHER ABOUT THE FUTURE

Article 50 of the EU Treaty says

Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.”

AGREEING GUIDELINES ON THE EU SIDE

It is important to note here that it will be the Commission that will do the actual negotiation with the UK, but it will do so under guidelines agreed by the Heads of Government of the 27 Member states meeting in the European Council. It will also have to bear in mind that the final deal will have to approved by the European Parliament  too.

Given that the European Council operates by unanimity, and that its members are heads of government and each of them have countries to run at home, agreeing these guidelines will take time and be difficult.

Any one country can object to any part of the guidelines.

There are wide differences between EU member states in their sensitivity to developments in the UK. It is to be expected that

  • some will emphasise a continuing right for their citizens to live and work in the UK,
  • others will emphasise trade with the UK, and yet
  • others will emphasise how the make gains for their businesses from the exclusion of UK competition(for example in financial services).

THE FUTURE FRAMEWORK FOR EU/UK RELATIONS

It is also important to note that Article 50 says that the proposed Withdrawal Treaty shall take account of the” framework” of the withdrawing states” future relationship” with the Union.

There is no guidance in the Treaty as to what this “framework” document might say.

In their Referendum, UK voters were asked if they wanted to leave the EU, but their views were not sought on the sort of framework for future relations they would approve.

Nothing appeared on the ballot paper about

  • access to the EU market for UK produced goods or services, about leaving the European Economic Area (which includes several non EU countries) or about what UK voters would want the agreement with EU to say about
  • the status of UK citizens already living in EU countries after the UK has left
  • the status of EU citizens already living in the UK or about
  • the future rights of EU or UK citizens to live and work in one another’s  jurisdictions or to avail of social services while there

DIFFERENT PROCEDURES FOR CONCLUDING THESE NEGOTIATIONS

Article 50 continues

“ That agreement  (for the withdrawal of a state) shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”

So while the Council guidelines for the negotiation require unanimity, the actual approval of the final withdrawal Treaty can be done by qualified majority.

But there is a time limit because Article 50 goes on to say

“ The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. “

This two year time limit applies to the Withdrawal Treaty, but there is no time limit for the negotiation the Framework for future relations.

If , within two years of the sending by the UK of its article 50 letter seeking to withdraw from the EU, a Withdrawal Treaty has not been agreed by the UK on one side, and a qualified majority  on the EU side, the UK is simply out of the EU, with no rights at all on the EU market beyond those enjoyed  by any state anywhere in the world.

This is a real doomsday scenario, but it is a realistic possibility, because the gaps in the negotiating positions between the UK and a potential blocking minority of EU states (26.3% of weighted votes representing at least 35% of the EU population) are very wide.

But, at least, the withdrawal Treaty can be approved on the EU side by a qualified majority (73.9% of the weighted votes  representing 65% of the EU population).

Agreeing the terms of the Framework agreement with the UK, of which the Withdrawal Treaty must “take account ” will be even more difficult, because this Future Framework Agreement will probably have to be unanimously agreed by ALL 27 EU states and their parliaments, unless it is a very narrow agreement covering only trade in goods.

If it is wider than this, it is likely to be deemed a so called “mixed agreement”, which is an agreement that includes matters where the competence is shared between the EU and the member states.

A ROCKY PATH TO RATIFICATION FOR A FUTURE UK/EU FRAMEWORK DEAL

In this case, every member state parliament, as well as every member state government, will have to approve the Framework agreement with the UK.

This is what happened with the recently concluded EU Agreement with Canada, which, as you will remember, was threatened with a veto by Belgium, because under internal Belgian constitutional arrangements, all five subsidiary parliaments in Belgium must agree to any international treaty signed by Belgium, and two of them did not agree.

A similar threat to an Agreement with the UK could come from a decision to call referendum  in a member state.

For example, the future of an EU Agreement with Ukraine has been put in doubt by its defeat in a referendum in the Netherlands, requisitioned by a petition of only 300,000 signatories out of a total population of 17 million, and on a turnout of slightly above the minimum required 30%.

It is easier nowadays to organise petitions online, so this could be another threat to a Framework Agreement with the UK, not just in the Netherlands, but in any other countries with similar petition/referendum provisions.

The UK could not really object to this happening because the UK itself, on 23 June, used a national referendum to make a decision affecting the whole of Europe in a profound way.

COULD THE UK CHANGE ITS MIND?

Could the UK change its mind, when it discovers that things are not turning out as its voters, and those politicians who favoured leaving the EU, hoped they would?

Article 50 says

“ If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”

Article 49 requires the unanimous agreement of all existing member states, and of the European Parliament, to the readmission to the European Union of a member state, just as it would to a state applying to join for the first time.

In other words, the UK, seeking to rejoin the EU after having left, would be in exactly the same position as Serbia, Montenegro or Turkey is today.

A more interesting question is whether the UK, having written its Article 50 letter in March 2017, could decide, say in late 2018, just before the two year time limit  would expire in March 2019, that it wanted to withdraw the letter, and stay in the EU after all , on the existing terms?

This is not an easy question to answer.

Article 50 doesn’t say that notification once given can be withdrawn, but nor does it say that notification can’t be withdrawn.

The prevalent view is, perhaps, that notice can be withdrawn prior to actual withdrawal from the EU but the position is not clear. If revocation of an article 50 notice was not accepted by all other EU members, the Court of Justice of the European Union would have to decide the point.

This may all sound a little fanciful  at this point, but it is possible that, by late 2018, the UK might have a different view on EU membership to the one it had on 23 June 2016.

It would certainly have to organise another referendum, which could be difficult given the rigid two year deadline for complete exclusion, in the absence of an agreed Withdrawal Treaty.

But if the discussions on the Framework Agreement were going really badly, or if  the economic costs of separation were just proving greater than expected, and if prospects did not look like improving, a majority of MPs might decide to consult the voters on the possibility of taking back the Article 50 letter.

Already there is some sign that UK opinion has shifted slightly since the 23 June Referendum.

Asked in a Eurobarometer  poll last September, three months after the Referendum, whether they thought the  UK benefitted from being in the EU

  • 56%  in the UK said they thought the UK had benefitted, an increase of  5 percentage points on the previous poll and
  • only 34% said they thought it had not, a drop of 2 points on the previous poll

If that trend were to continue, things could look different in the late 2018 or early 2019.

But it would be very difficult politically to change course. National pride would be hurt.  Telling voters they made a mistake is rarely a winning political strategy……even though voters do sometimes make mistakes

CONTENT OF WITHDRAWAL TREATY

Let me now turn to what I think will be the content of the two negotiations

First ,the Withdrawal Treaty negotiation and

Second, the Framework of Future Relations negotiation

My understanding is that the Withdrawal negotiation itself is likely to cover quite a narrow, but very contentious, range of issues.

These will probably include five broad topics

  • What the UK will have to pay to leave,  what will be the UK share of any remaining financial commitments dating from its time as a member, covering matters such as pensions of EU officials , other obligations outstanding, less the UK ‘s share in EU assets
  • The mechanics and costs of moving EU institutions, like the Banking Authority and the Medicines Agency, out of the UK and into an EU country (perhaps Ireland)
  • The Rights of EU citizens already living in the UK, and UK citizens already living in an EU country. The rights of future migrants from the UK to the EU, and vice versa, will be for the Future Framework negotiation
  • The relationship of the UK with the WTO after it has left the EU

+ Special situations concerning the land boundary between the UK and the EU, as in Ireland and at Gibraltar. It is good that this being dealt with upfront, and not just buried in the wider Framework negotiations. But, obviously, the content of the final Framework deal, if there is one, is bound to affect what happens on the Irish border.

While these five issues are, on their face, straight forward, the UK contribution to the EU budget was elevated into a big issue in UK politics over the past few years. False statements were made before the referendum about the amount the UK would get back by leaving,  and a gain of £350 million a week was promised by some who now hold high office in the UK government.

So this could become a very difficult discussion.

CONTENT OF FUTURE FRAMEWORK TREATY

The Future Framework negotiation will be a much wider one and will take in matters of direct relevance to ICMSA members, such as

  • whether the EU Common External Tariff will have to be levied on agricultural products coming into Ireland from the UK, or Northern Ireland
  • how the origin of imports from the UK will be verified to ensure that they are not dumping third country products on our market,
  • how veterinary and food safety standards will be verified, and how and by whom smuggling will be suppressed.
  • whether geographic indicators will be recognised
  • if there will be a tariff free quota to allow existing trade levels to continue or if all trade will bear the appropriate tariff

The tariff issue will be particularly difficult in the food sector, because this is the sector in which the EU has the highest tariffs, and restrictions, on third country imports in order to protect the incomes of EU farmers.

Everything depends on what sort of food and agriculture policy the UK decides to follow outside the EU. Will they go for a “cheap food” policy like they had before they joined the EU 40 years ago or will they retain current supports for farmers and rural life?

There is no indication so far as the what choice they will make, at least after 2020.

Negotiations about product  safety, rules of origin, and related issues will arise with all products and services, even those to which no tariff applies, because once it has left the EU, the UK will be free to depart from recognised EU standards.

If the UK rejects the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, as Prime Minister May says she will, there will no longer be a referee to interpret the rules of the shared market, and all markets need a referee.

If one wants to assess the likely complexity of a Future Framework Agreement the UK and the EU will have to negotiate with one another, one has only to look at the content of the Agreement the EU has concluded  with Canada.

As well as tariffs and trade, that agreement had to cover

  • product testing and standards….would each side recognise the other side’s tests for every product or would there be duplication?
  • mutual recognition of professional qualifications….a huge field
  • the right of EU and UK firms to sell goods and services to government entities in one another’s jurisdictions
  • protection from discrimination against EU investors in the UK and vice versa
  • access to fishing grounds

The EU and the UK negotiators will not only have to reach agreement on the substance of how these matters are to be handled, but  they will also have to agree a procedure for settling disputes about interpretation, because the UK, outside the EU, will not accept the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)

But probably the most contentious issue in the Future Framework negotiation will be right of people to emigrate to the UK from the EU, and vice versa.

Control of Immigration was not, initially, one of the UK’s complaints about the EU.

The Blair government actually opened the UK to  central and east European EU immigrants, in 2004, before it was obliged to under the Accession Treaties for those countries.

But, during the Referendum campaign, immigration became the central debating point ,and leaving the EU was presented as the way of “taking back control” of immigration.

The case was over stated.

Of all immigrants moving to the UK in 2014,

  • 13% were UK citizens returning home.  
  • 42% were EU nationals emigrating to the UK. But the biggest number,
  • 45%, were non EU nationals moving to the UK.

The UK already had full “control” over 45% of all immigration which came from non EU countries, and the Minister who exercised that control then, the Home secretary, is now the Prime Minister.

But in politics, perception is sometimes more important than reality, and immigration from the EU is perceived to be a problem by UK voters.

The EU side has taken a firm line on this. There will be no participation of the UK in the EU Single market without free movement of people to work. If capital is free to move, people should be free to move too. No Single market without free movement. Discrimination on the basis of nationality is excluded within the EU, and a state should not be able to leave the EU, introduce such discrimination, but still have all the other benefits of access to the EU market. If that option were the open, others EU members would be inclined to follow the UK out of the EU.

The fact that there must be unanimous agreement, by all 27 EU countries, to the Future Framework is relevant here. Countries like Poland will not be keen on a breach of the free movement principle.

WILL AN INTERIM DEAL BE NEEDED IN 2019?

I think it should be clear, from all I have said, that finalising a Framework Agreement with the UK within the two year time frame will be so difficult as to be almost impossible.

The Agreement with Canada took six years to negotiate and it was much less complex than any agreement with the UK would be.

So what happens, in late March 2019, when the 2 year deadline is reached, if the Withdrawal Treaty has been agreed, but  if the Future Framework negotiations are still going on, with no certainty whether they are going to succeed or not?

In this case, some form of interim agreement with the UK might have to be reached. This might involve the UK leaving the EU, losing its voting rights, but still retaining full access to the EU market until a final Framework Agreement was reached.

There will be almost as many knotty questions to answer about  that sort of an Interim Agreement as there would be about a Final Agreement.

For example, what contribution would the UK  then continue to make to the EU budget?

Would there be a time limit on the Interim Agreement, and could it be extended?

Would the UK accept the jurisdiction of the ECJ during the Interim?

Would an Interim Agreement have to be approved by the parliaments of all 27 member states?

Does the EU Treaty allow for such an Interim Agreement?

CONCLUSION

My conclusion from all of this is that the decision of the UK Conservative Party to have a referendum on EU membership, without a clear alternative being known, was unwise because it will lead to a huge diversion of time and talent away from more constructive purposes.

Since the Referendum, the UK government has, retrospectively, interpreted the vote to mean a decision to leave the EEA, and leaving the European Customs Union, things that were not on the ballot paper, and are not required by its wording at all. That is undemocratic.

Brexit poses disproportionately great challenges to Ireland. It will require us to build new and stronger alliances in every EU country, and to do that we will need to understand the interests of other countries almost as well as we understand our own. We must not make the mistake David Cameron made of thinking that an understanding with Germany will deliver what we want from the EU. In the EU, every country counts.

………………………………………………………………………………………

Speech  by John Bruton,  at the AGM of the ICMSA at 4pm on Monday 28 November in the Castletroy Park Hotel, Limerick

 

THE VERDICT ON DAVID CAMERON’S PRIME MINISTERSHIP

cameron-at-10I read “Cameron at 10…the Verdict”, by Anthony Seldon and Peter Snowdon, over the summer, to understand how the UK came to hold a referendum on leaving the European Union, whose aftermath will bog down the UK and the EU in unproductive work, for years to come.

The first thing to say is that this is a good and well researched book.

It shows how the Liberal Democrat /Conservative Coalition came together in an atmosphere of good will and cordiality. It was bedded down by good institutional arrangements, which held it together right to the end.

But the cordiality disappeared when the Conservatives campaigned, with venom, to defeat the referendum on the Alternative Vote (PR in a single member constituency).

It is interesting to note that the Lib Dems loyally supported the austerity policies of the government, including on tuition fees which did them a great deal of electoral damage.

The reforms introduced by the Coalition, in education, health and welfare were important, and enduring. But they were not very different from what might have been done by a government led by Tony Blair. Cameron’s military intervention in Libya, for which he was a much greater cheerleader than Obama, was just as much a disaster as Blair’s intervention in Iraq. But Cameron knew what had happened in Iraq, so there is less excuse for him.

Cameron’s idea of a “Big Society”, where local communities take over responsibilities from government, never amounted to much. As one critic said “most people I know do not want to run their local library or school, they just want the service to work”.

Cameron’s problem with the European Union was not so much that he was a Eurosceptic, but that, like many Britons, he just did not find the EU interesting at all. Like his compatriots, he thought the EU was something external to the UK, with which the UK did business on an arm’s length basis, rather than something of which the UK was a full member.

He did not invest time in it, and thought that problems could simply be sorted out by a chat with Angela Merkel, as if the other countries would always do what she told them.  Merkel for her part thought Cameron was “apt to make his mind up too quickly”, and ask for more than he could ever hope to get. She preferred to start her negotiations with modest demands and build on them.

In 2007, as a newly elected leader of his Party, he had promised a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, but by the time he came into office it was too late for that, because the Treaty had been already ratified. But his failure to keep that so called “promise” left him with problems with his backbenchers for the rest of his career.

The same backbenchers were also, of course, angry with him because he had not won the election in 2011, and instead had to opt for a Coalition with the Europhile Liberal Democrats.

The authors of this book think that Cameron’s position was so weak that he had no option, in 2013, but to promise an In/Out referendum. I disagree.  While there was a real threat from UKIP, I do not believe his party would have brought him down over this issue. There is no evidence that Cameron gave any serious thought to what ought to be done if the people voted for “Leave”.

When he came to fight the Referendum itself, he chose to appeal only to people’s pockets, and not to their hearts, or to their sense of self respect.

He could have pointed out that in 1914, Britain went to war, not for its Empire, but for Europe…to defend Belgian neutrality.

He could have reminded his fellow citizen that Britons went to war in 1939, also for Europe, to defend Poland.

 He did not do so.

Such an appeal to patriotism could have countered the xenophobia that occupied the emotional space,  that his materialistic campaign left unoccupied.

But then it emerges in this book that Cameron himself sincerely believed in having a cap on immigration, including from Poland, the country Britain went to war to defend in 1939.

In 2010, he had said “Kick us out in 5 years, if we don’t deliver a cap on immigration”. A well informed Party Leader would have known, even then, that such a promise was incompatible with his country’s obligations as an EU member!

PULLING OUT THE 40 YEAR OLD THREADS THAT BIND THE UK AND THE EU TOGETHER

8268467475_fc8fb937e8_zDisengaging the UK from the EU will be like undoing all the stitching of a patchwork quilt, and then re stitching some parts of the quilt together, while making a new quilt of the rest. The UK is, at the moment, stitched into thousands of regulations and international treaties, which it made as a member of the EU over the last 43 years. Each piece of stitching will have to be reviewed both on its own merits and  for  the effect rearranging it might have on other parts of the quilt.

This is, first and foremost, a problem for the UK itself.

UK GOALS YET TO BE DETERMINED

We all think we know what UK voters voted against on 23 June. But nobody, even in the Conservative government itself, has a clear idea what UK voters voted FOR.  People voted to leave the EU for contradictory reasons.

Many voted  to leave because they wanted more protection from global competition. On the other hand, many of the Leave campaign leaders wanted to get out of the EU, so they could deregulate their economy, dispense with EU social rights, and promote more global competition and lower costs ( wages) in the UK economy.

The UK government must first decide which of these economic policies it wants and, only when it has done that, can it decide what sort of relationship it wants with the EU.

MUST THE UK BE OUT OF THE EU BEFORE IT MAKES A DEAL?

The 27 EU heads of government, on 29 June, told the UK that any trade agreement with it will be concluded with it “as a third country”.

This could be interpreted as meaning that the UK must first become a “third country”, by withdrawing from the EU, before it can have a trade agreement with the EU. This could mean that the UK would have to be out of the EU, before it knew what terms it might get on trade. This would be a very hard line EU position.

If that is what the 27 leaders meant , it is  probably contrary to Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which says a Withdrawal Treaty must take account of the “ framework” of the withdrawing country’s  ”future relationship” with the EU.

……..OR MUST THERE BE TWO SIMULTANEOUS NEGOTIATIONS?

 I believe Article 50 means that there will be two negotiations,

 one on “Withdrawal” and

 one on the” Framework” of the future relationship.

I believe the two treaties must be negotiated, simultaneously and in parallel, and that the Framework  agreement cannot wait until the UK is already a “third country”, as  seemed to be implied by the 27 leaders on 29 June .

Ireland cannot afford to wait ,until the UK is already a “third country”, before border, travel, and residency issues between Ireland and UK are sorted out. We need these issues sorted out before the UK leaves.

IT WILL BE LIKE A DIVORCE NEGOTIATION

As with a divorce, the Withdrawal Treaty will be about dividing up the property. It may be easy enough to negotiate.

The Framework Treaty will be about the future, and like marital disputes about access to and care for children, will prove to be much more fraught and complex.

The question of whether there is  a “hard border” or not,  will flow from  what the UK  looks for, and what it  gets, in its Framework negotiations.

Nobody knows yet what the UK will look for, so this question is impossible to answer. The 27 EU leaders rightly insisted that the four freedoms – freedom of movement of people, goods, capital  and services- go together. Nobody has any idea yet how the UK will propose to get around that.

UK CANNOT MAKE DEALS WITH OTHERS WHILE IT IS STILL AN EU MEMBER

If the UK were to heed the call of Liam Fox MP, the UK’s new Minister for International Trade, that the UK   leave the EU Customs Union, so it could negotiate trade agreements with countries outside the EU, this would mean an immediate  hard border in Ireland. The Taoiseach’s diplomacy in recent days has probably helped head that threat off. Implementing Minister Fox’s proposal would have breached a UK Treaty obligation, a very serious matter for a country that relies on 30000 international Treaties.

The sort of border we have in Ireland will depend on the shape of the final UK/EU Framework agreement on all the four freedoms. Ireland can do no side deal with the UK.

 And if Ireland is to influence the EU positions in its favour, it has to present its case as  beneficial to Europe as a whole. It cannot be, or be seen to be, on both sides of the table at the same time, in what will prove to be a highly contentious negotiation.

Until it leaves, the UK is still a member of the EU, and is bound by all EU rules. It will fully participate in all key EU decisions, except those concerning  it’s own exit terms.

This means that the UK cannot do trade deals with other countries, while still in the EU.

Indeed it would appear it cannot even enter into commitments about future deals, particularly ones that might undercut EU negotiating positions.

 This is because, as long as it is still an EU member, the UK must, under Article 4 of the Treaty, act in “sincere cooperation” with its EU partners. The meaning of “sincere cooperation” was elaborated by the European Court  in judgements it made on  cases the Commission took against Germany and Greece  ,to overturn separate understandings each had forged  with other countries, on matters that were EU responsibilities without EU involvement .

So, to ensure that he stays within the law, Liam Fox may have to take a Commission official with him on all his trade travels around the globe, at least until the UK has finally left the EU!

THE UK SHOULD NOT BE RUSHED INTO TRIGGERING ARTICLE 50

Indeed the more closely the UK government looks at its options, the longer it may take to decide when to trigger Article 50.

The leaders of the EU 27 should not rush the UK on this.  Short term uncertainty is a very small price to pay for avoiding a botched and ill prepared exit negotiation.  Everyone would lose from that.

The UK civil service did not, after all, expect to find itself in this position. Indeed UK civil service studies, done long before the Referendum, concluded that the UK’s then existing relationship with the EU was just about right. Furthermore, once Article 50 is triggered, the UK cannot, easily or legally, change its mind and revert to the status quo, EVEN after a General Election.

A MAJOR DISTRACTION FROM OTHER  VITAL WORK

Meanwhile, Europe, with so much other work to do, has to turn inwards and devote itself to unravelling 43 years of interweaving between Britain and Europe. All this highly demanding technical work has to be done, at a time when Europe should be looking outwards towards the opportunities and threats of a rapidly changing and unstable world.

THE UK NEEDS TO WORK OUT WHAT IT VOTED FOR LAST MONTH

union-jack-1027896_960_720I believe the UK itself needs to prepare a realistic proposal, taking the EU Treaty obligations of others into account, on the future relationship between the EU and the UK that it believes would be in the interest of both the UK and the EU.

That is a process that has to take place in the UK alone and not, at this stage in the other EU countries.

The UK needs to do its home work first. The UK needs to take full ownership of the challenge posed by decision in the referendum that the UK itself decided to have .

My own sense is that a relationship between EU and UK that is limited to trade in goods, and to free travel with passport controls, is easily attainable, if the UK is willing to accept EU goods safety standards.

The question is whether the UK would settle for that.

Services and movement of people are inherently inter related so this would not cover financial services exports from the UK.

On migration, the UK position is made difficult by the fact that the UK long pressed for early EU enlargement, and then, like Ireland, opened itself the migration from the new EU members without availing of the transition period.

Now, without acknowledging its own contribution to the dilemma in which it finds itself, the UK has decided to reverse all this by leaving the EU, as if the EU alone was responsible for the consequences of these UK decisions.

I fear that these contradictions within the thought processes of the UK itself will not be resolved without some sort of crisis.

From what I read, it seems to me that UK leaders are still going around the continent looking to EU leaders to solve the contradictions in the UK’s own thinking for them, which is a bit unfair.

The UK should not try to pick off individual EU states by making them special offers, because that will anger other EU states. The governments of all the 27 remaining EU states have to bring their public opinions with them too

The UK needs an agreement that all the EU states and the elected European Parliament can live with.

Ultimately all EU states are bound by the Treaties, and are required by law to cooperate sincerely with one another to “attain the Union’s objectives”.

The European Court of Justice and the European Commission are obliged to follow the EU Treaties and ensure they are respected by the member states, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission.

The Commission represents the common EU interest, and is particularly attentive to the needs of smaller states. The UK should never give the impression that it would like to bypass the Commission, by going over the Commission’s head to Berlin or Paris.

While the European Council will authorize the negotiations with the UK, it is the Commission that will do the negotiation. The European Council can issue negotiating directives to the Commission, but the European Council acts by unanimity, which leaves a lot of discretion to the Commission.

So the UK needs to come up with a comprehensive proposal that is framed in the context of these Treaties and of the needs of each of the 27 (very different) EU states.

It should probably publish that proposal, in the form of a Green Paper, before triggering Article 50.

WILL BREXIT NEGOTIATIONS BE OVER BEFORE THE 2020 UK  GENERAL ELECTION?

union-jack-1027896_960_720The next UK General Election will be in 2020.  If the Article 50 notice is served in 2017, it is possible that the process of UK withdrawal from the EU will not be concluded before the UK General Election in 2020.

That might allow the UK Electorate to take a second look at their decision of 23 June.

The Article 50 process, once activated, proceeds according to paragraph 2 of  Article 50.

 The mechanics of the negotiation are set out in Article 218 (3), which governs the making in international agreements by the EU.

It provides for the negotiation to be done by the Commission, subject to directives from the European Council. Ireland would formally make its input via the Council.

A key phrase in Article 50 is that the Withdrawal negotiation would be conducted

 “taking account of the future framework of its relationship”

with the country leaving the EU .

In other words, the Withdrawal would take place within a wider framework, which would also be  agreed between the EU and  the UK.

So there would be two parallel processes

  •  a negotiation of a framework of  the future relationship with the UK, and
  •  the Withdrawal negotiation itself.

In effect the two negotiations would be linked.

This is different from what Commissioner Malmstrom said recently.

She said the broader negotiation could not take place until AFTER the Withdrawal agreement with the UK was concluded, and the UK was already outside the EU.

Her interpretation seems to me to be contradicted by the words of Article 50 because it ignores the fact that the reference in Article 50 to a broader framework agreement.

If the  formal  Withdrawal arrangement under Article 218 (3) has to be subject to a wider framework being agreed, the whole process could take a very long time indeed,  and meanwhile the  status quo would continue until both agreements are completed and ratified.

The Withdrawal part could be quickly agreed, but the future framework would be much more difficult and could drag on and on, because it would have to cover all sorts of knotty trade and regulatory issues which could not be settled on the basis of generalities.

That is assuming the UK does not join the EEA, which would simplify these “framework” issues.

It also assumes unanimous consent in 2019 of the 27 EU members to extend the 2 year withdrawal period, but that should not be impossible

Of course, it requires the UK  not to derail the process by unilaterally breaching the Treaties by failing to implement EU law, during the negotiations, Eg by immigration  controls or repealing  some EU legislation on working hours.

It assumes that the UK would be willing to stay in a “half in/ half out” position for a long time, without enjoying the supposed benefits of Withdrawal, but with its influence in the EU diminished.

The UK should probably have given more thought to these complexities before triggering a  referendum.

 But the complexities do allow time for reconsideration, assuming there is, at some time in the next three years, a political willingness to reconsider in the UK.

That does not look likely now, but moods can change.

The UK has a big balance of payments deficit already….Brexit or no Brexit.

The inevitable unwinding of that deficit will reduce economic growth, which normally would also reduce immigration. So opinion may be different in 2020.

That said, other EU countries, including Ireland must prepare our economies on the assumption that full Brexit will happen.

UK GOVERNMENT FIRST STEPS NOW

Now that the UK has voted to leave the EU, the first step has to be taken by the UK Government.

It must decide what sort of relationship it wants to have, trade wise, with the rest of the world.

At the moment, that is governed by agreements negotiated, for the UK, by the EU.

If the UK simply leaves the EU, all those agreements will  fall, as does UK membership of the World Trade Organisation(WTO). Agreements with dozens of non EU countries, will have to be negotiated again, at the same time as negotiating  with the EU. A lot of work.

Basically the UK government will have to choose choice between three options

  • Leave the EU and, like Norway, apply to join the European Economic Area (EEA),
  • Negotiate a new special trade agreement, like the agreement Canada or Switzerland has with the EU
  • Leave the EU without any trade agreement and apply, as a separate country, to join the WTO

The EEA option could be put in place quickly and would not disrupt trade all that much.

The EEA is a readymade model for external association by a non member with the EU. It could be taken down from the shelf, so to speak.  But, as an EEA member, the UK would still have to implement EU regulations and contribute to the EU budget. It would not allow curbs on EU immigration. The EEA option has been dismissed by “Leave“ campaigners, but it does involve leaving the EU, and  complies  with the literal terms of  the  referendum decision.

If the UK experiences severe balance of payments problems over the summer, the EEA option may become attractive. The UK already has a big balance of payments deficit anyway and capital inflows may be inhibited by the Leave vote. The EEA option would buy time, and would not preclude leaving altogether eventually.

The second option, a special trade deal, would be much more difficult.

It would require a detailed negotiation on every type of product or service sale between the UK and the 27 member countries of the EU, including across our border.

Such an agreement would take years to negotiate (probably 7 or 8 years), because it would be subject to domestic political constraints, and political blackmail attempts, in all EU countries, each of whom  would have to ratify it. If it proposed curbs on immigration from the EU, the EU countries affected  would make difficulties with other aspects of the deal, as a bargaining counter.

It is unlikely that a Trade Agreement would allow the UK to sell financial services into the EU. Indeed it would be in the interest of EU countries, that might hope to attract financial services, to make sure the UK got few concessions .

The third option…leaving the EU with no agreement… could come about, either because that was what the UK chose, or because the negotiations on a special trade deal broke down or were not ratified by one or two EU states.

It would require the application of the EU common external tariff to UK or Northern Irish products crossing the border into the Republic.

Average EU tariffs are around 4%, but on agricultural goods the mean tariff is 18%. The imposition of these tariffs is a key part of the Common Agricultural Policy, which protects the incomes of EU farmers. We would have no option but collect them at customs posts along our border. All forms of food manufacture and distribution within the two islands would be disrupted.

The disruption of the complex supply chain of the modern food industry would be dramatic and the knock on effects impossible to calculate.

A similar effect might be felt by the car parts industry, which is subject to tariffs, and is important to some parts of England.

Meanwhile the remaining 27 countries of the EU, and the EU institutions, will have a lot of thinking to do too.

They need to respond decisivly to the (false) claim that the EU is not democratic.

All EU legislation has to be passed by a democratically elected European Parliament, and also by a Council of Ministers who represent the democratically elected governments of the 28 EU countries.

The members of the European Commission must be approved by the democratically elected European Parliament.

But there is room to further  improve  EU democracy.

I  would make two suggestions ,

  • The President of the European Commission should be directly elected by the people of the EU in a two round election , at the same time as the European Parliament Elections every 5 years

2.)To create a closer link between National Parliaments and the EU, a minimum of nine national parliaments agreeing should be sufficient to require the Commission to put forward a proposal on a topic allowed by the EU Treaties . National Parliaments can already delay EU legislation, so they should be free to make positive proposals too.

That said, the EU should avoid over promising, and should not allow itself to be blamed for all the problems people face in their daily lives.

The EU is not an all powerful monolith that can solve the problems caused by technological change and globalisation. It is just a loose voluntary confederation of 28 countries, with no tax raising powers of its own. Nor is the EU responsible for debts mistakenly taken on by its members.

If the losers of globalisation and technological change are to be sheltered from misfortune, it is for the 27 states, not the EU itself, that has the taxing power to redistribute money from the winners from globalisation  to the losers.

The UK has not been particularly generous in this regard.  Its welfare system is modest, and its investment in productivity improvement has been poor.

In some respects, UK voters  have just mistakenly blamed  the EU. for the effects of the  omissions, and under performance, of successive UK governments.

THE EU IS ALREADY DEMOCRATIC…..TWO WAYS IN WHICH THAT CAN BE MADE MORE VISIBLE

The-UK-and-EU-flags-010One of the recurring themes in the debate about UK membership on the EU is the (false) claim that the EU is not democratic.

All EU legislation has to be passed by a democratically elected European Parliament and also by a Council of Ministers who represent the democratically elected governments of the 28 EU countries.

It is true that the members of the European Commission are not democratically elected by the people, but their names must be proposed by democratically elected governments of the 28 countries, and the Commission as a whole must be approved by the democratically elected European Parliament.

In many countries, Ministers serve in government who have not, as individuals, been elected directly. Their democratic mandate comes from the elected government of which they are part.

This is not to say the there is no room to improve the democratic legitimacy of the EU, and of its policies. I believe the EU could respond to the UK referendum by further enhancing EU wide democracy.

I make two suggestions to improve the visibility of the democratic character of the EU, and create a genuinely European democratic debate, rather than 28 separate national debates about EU matters

  • The President of the European Commission should be directly elected in a two round election by the entire people of the EU, at the same time as the European Parliament Elections
  • It should be possible for the National Parliament of the 28 to come together to request that the Commission put forward a proposal on a particular matter. National Parliaments( if a minimum number agree) already have a right to petition to delay a piece of EU legislation, so why not give them a positive right to seek the promotion of a piece of legislation (if they can obtain a similar level of support across a number of countries).

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