Opinions & Ideas

Category: BREXIT Page 1 of 7

ALL TRADE RESTS ON RESPECT FOR TREATIES

The fact that the UK government is now saying it will pass legislation that will break an international Treaty it signed and ratified little over a year ago, is very serious. It undermines Britain’s aspiration to be a globally trading nation.

All trade between nations rests, ultimately, on respect for Treaties and contracts.

Deliberately breaching commitments, freely given in a Treaty, undermines the whole structure of global relations between states.

 If one cannot rely on a commitment in a Treaty, nothing is reliable.

The EU only continues to exist because its member states respect the Treaties that set it up ( as some seem to have forgotten in another context recently).

If the UK, by its breach of the Withdrawal Treaty commitments it gave  on checks on goods going from Britain to Northern Ireland, forces Ireland to introduce checks on the Irish land border,  in order to protect Ireland’s status as a fully complaint EU member, it will undermine the structure that has brought peace to these islands. 

We could be living with the consequences of this long after Boris Johnson has passed from the political scene.

A FAILURE TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

LACK OF FAIR PROCESS, OR OF RESPECT FOR THE EU TREATIES

I have always believed that the independence of members of the European Commission was a keystone of successful European integration.

 Commissioners are obliged by their oath of office to seek a European solution to problems, rather than just seek a balance between conflicting national interests.

 Since 1958, they have done so, and this is why European integration has succeeded, while efforts at integration on other continents have failed, under the weight of national egoism.

The larger the membership of the European Union became, the more important did the independence of Commissioners from national politics become.

Some believe the Commission is too large. From an efficiency point of view, they have a point. 

But Ireland, among others, has insisted that, despite this, each member state should have one of its nationals as a member of the Commission at all times. 

But if the “one Commissioner per member state” rule is to be kept in place, as the Union enlarges, Commissioners, from all states large and small, must demonstrate that they put the European interest first, and are not subject to the vagaries and passions of politics in their country of origin. 

In other words, European Commissioners must be independent, and be seen to be so. All member states must be seen to respect this.

This is why I am so deeply troubled by the attitude take by the Irish government, and then  by President Von Der Leyen of the European Commission, to calls for the EU Trade Commissioner Phil Hogan to resign.

 Both of them failed in their understanding of the European Union, and of one of its vital interests….. namely the  visible independence of members of the European Commission from the politics of any one EU state, large or small. 

I was genuinely shocked by what happened.

 Late in the evening of 22 August,  the leaders of the Irish Government called on the EU Trade Commissioner, Phil Hogan to “consider his position”. Those words mean resign.

 They piled on the pressure thereafter, with a further statement, on 23 August, containing a political determination that he had broken their Covid 19 rules. 

Phil Hogan did resign on 26 August.

 That was his decision and one he was entitled to make.

LESSONS FROM THIS PRECEDENT

But there are profound lessons to be learned by President Von der Leyen, and by the Commission as a whole , as to how, and to whom, Commissioners should be held accountable,  and a need to understand what this precedent means for the future political independence of Commissioners from their home governments.

 Separately, there are also questions to be asked about the internal management of, and the collegiality, of the Commission.

I will set out my concerns here, drawing on the words of the EU Treaty, which I helped draft as a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe.

On the 26 August, President Von der Leyen clearly withdrew any active support from Commissioner Hogan, and unquestioningly accepted the line of the Irish Government. This influenced him to resign his position.

 In this action, I contend that she did not fulfil all her responsibilities under the Treaties.

 I know she faced a genuine political difficulty. But the Treaties were framed do deal with fraught political situations, while preserving the independence of the Commission and due process.

 The Commission is guardian of the Treaties, and should be seen to defend the rules laid down in the Treaties in all circumstances, even when it is politically difficult. 

Article 245 of the Treaty requires member states to respect the independence of Commissioners. Ireland is bound by that article having ratified it in a referendum.

 One should note that Article 245 refers to respecting the independence of Commissioners individually, not just to the Commission as a whole.

 It is for the Irish government to say whether publicly demanding a Commissioner’s resignation, for an alleged breach of purely Irish rules, is compatible with the Irish government’s Treaty obligation under Article 245 to respect his independence, It had other options,

If any Commissioner is visiting a member state for any reason, he or she is subject to the laws of that state, on the same basis as any other citizen. A visiting Commissioner would not be above the law, but nor would she be below it either. 

If she breached the law, due process in the Courts ought to be applied, as to any citizen.

 This what would have happened if the visiting Commissioner was from any country other than Ireland and had had the difficulties which Phil Hogan had….due process would have been followed. 

 The statements of the Irish government, and the unsatisfactory explanations by Phil Hogan, did create political problems for the President of the Commission.

 She had to do something, but not necessarily what she did do.

 But there were options available to her which, inexplicably, she failed to use or even consider.

RULES IGNORED

 Commissioners are subject to a Code of Conduct, last updated in 2018. Under that Code,

 there is an ethics committee to determine if the Code has been breached. If the matter was urgent, there is provision for a time limit  to be set for a report by the Committee.

 But a reference to the Ethics Committee would have allowed for due process, and a calm and fair hearing. More importantly using this process would also have asserted the independence of the Commission as an institution.

 The Code says that it is to be applied “in good faith and with due consideration of the proportionality principle” and it allows for a reprimand. where the failing does not warrant asking the Commissioner to resign. 

Now, because of the course followed, we will never know if there was any breach at all of the Code at all by Phil Hogan. 

President Von der Leyen’s failure to use these mechanisms seems to be a serious failure to defend due process and proportionality, and to protect  the independence  of individual Commissioners, as she was required to do by the Treaty.

 The Commission and the Parliament should enquire into why she did not do so.  There are consequences now for the viability of the Code of Conduct, if it is not to be used in a case like this. 

CRITERIA NOT APPLIED

Was what Phil Hogan did a resigning matter anyway ?

Article 247 allows for only two grounds for asking a Commissioner to resign. There are that he or she is

“no longer being able to fulfil the conditions for the performance of his duties”

Or

” has been guilty of serious misconduct”.

I do not think either condition was met in this case.

Phil Hogan would have been fully capable of carrying out his duties while the Ethics Committee did its work. Instead his position is now effectively vacant.

Most people I have spoken to do not think the breaches committed by Phil Hogan, while foolish, amounted to “serious misconduct” within the meaning of Article 247.

 Failure to recollects all the details of a private visit over 2 weeks, or to issue a sufficient apology quickly enough, may be political failings, but they hardly  rise to the level of “serious misconduct”. Any deliberate and knowing breach of quarantine should have been dealt with in the Irish courts without fuss. 

 In any event, President von der Leyen would have been far wiser to have got an objective view on all these things from the Ethics Committee, before allowing Phil Hogan’s resignation.

WHY DID THE COMMISSION NOT MEET?

Another issue is the President’s failure to call a Commission meeting, if she was considering that a Commissioner should resign.

Under article 247 it is the Commission, not the President alone, who may compulsorily retire a Commissioner, and even then, they must have the approval of the European Court of Justice.  These safeguards were put in the Treaty to protect the independence of the Commission. They were ignored in this case.

The resultant weakening of the institutional independence of the Commission is very damaging to European integration and to the interests of smaller EU states. This should be of concern to the European Parliament.

WE NEED A FULL STRENGTH TEAM ON THE PITCH AS BREXIT REACHES THE ENDGAME

It is increasingly likely that, unless things change, on 1 January 2021,  we will have a no deal Brexit. The only agreement between the EU and the UK would then be the already ratified Withdrawal Agreement.

 There are only 50 working days left in which to make a broader agreement. The consequences of  a failure to do so  for Ireland will be as profound, and even as  long lasting, that those of Covid 19.

A failure to reach an EU/UK Agreement would mean a deep rift between the UK and Ireland.

 It would mean heightened tensions within Northern Ireland, disruptions to century’s old business relations, and a succession of high profile and prolonged court cases between the EU and the UK dragging on for years.

 Issues, on which agreement could easily have been settled in amicable give and take negotiations, will be used as hostages or for leverage on other issues. The economic and political damage would be incalculable.

We must do everything we can to avoid this.

Changing the EU Trade Commissioner in such circumstances would be dangerous.  Trying to change horses in mid stream is always difficult. But attempting to do so at the height of a flood, in high winds, would  be even more so.

The EU would lose an exceptionally competent Trade Commissioner when he was never more needed. An Irishman would no longer hold the Trade portfolio. The independence of the European commission, a vital ingredient in the EU’s success would have been compromised…a huge loss for all smaller EU states.

According to Michel Barnier, the EU/UK talks , which ended last week, seemed at times to be going “backwards rather than forwards”.

The impasse has been reached for three reasons.

THE MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

Firstly, the two sides have set themselves incompatible objectives.

The EU side wants a “wide ranging economic partnership” between the UK and the EU with ”a level playing field for open and fair competition”. The UK also agreed to this objective in the joint political declaration  made with the EU at the time of the Withdrawal Agreement.

Since it agreed to this, the UK has had a General Election, and it has changed its mind. Now it is insisting, in the uncompromising words of it chief negotiator, on

 “sovereign control over our laws, our borders, and our waters”.

This formula fails to take account of the fact that any Agreement the UK might make with the EU (or with anyone else) on standards for goods, services or food stuffs necessarily involves a diminution of sovereign control.

Even being in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) involves accepting its rulings which are a diminution of “sovereign control”. This is why Donald Trump does not like the WTO and is trying to undermine it.

The Withdrawal Agreement from the EU (WA), which the UK has already ratified,  also involves a diminution of sovereign control by Westminster over the laws that will apply in Northern Ireland (NI) and thus within the UK.

 The WA obliges the UK to apply EU laws on tariffs and standards to goods entering NI from Britain, ie. going from one part of the UK to another.

This obligation is one of the reasons given by a group of UK parliamentarians, including Ian Duncan Smith, David Trimble, Bill Cash, Owen Patterson and Sammy Wilson, for wanting the UK to withdraw from the Withdrawal Agreement, even though most of them voted for it last year!

Sovereignty is a metaphysical concept, not a practical policy.

Attempting to apply it literally would make structured, and predictable, international cooperation between states impossible. That is not understood by many in the UK Conservative Party.

THE METHOD OF NEGOTIATION

The second difficulty is one of negotiating method. The legal and political timetables do not gel.

The UK wants to discuss the legal texts of a possible Free Trade Agreement first, and leave the controversial issues, like level playing field competition and fisheries, over until the endgame in October.

The EU side wants serious engagement to start on these controversial issues straight away .

Any resolution of these controversial issues will require complex legal drafting, which cannot be left to the last minute. After all, these legal texts will have to be approved by The EU and UK Parliaments before the end of this year.

There can be no ambiguities or late night sloppy drafting.

The problem is that the UK negotiator cannot yet get instructions, on the compromises he might make , from Boris Johnson. Boris Johnson is preoccupied instead with Covid 19, and with keeping the likes of Ian Duncan Smith and Co. onside.  He is a last minute type of guy. 

TRADE RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLOCS

The Third difficulty is  that of making provision for with the Trade Agreements the UK wants to make in future with other countries like the US, Japan and New Zealand. Freedom to make such deals was presented to UK voters as one of the benefits of Brexit.

The underlying problem here is that the UK government has yet to make up its mind on whether it will continue with the EU’s strict precautionary policy on food safety, or adopt the  more permissive approach favoured by the US.

Similar policy choices will have to be made by the UK on chemicals, energy efficiency displays, and geographical indicators.

The more the UK diverges from existing EU standards on these issues, the more intrusive will have to be the controls on goods coming into  Northern Ireland from Britain, and the more acute will be the distress in Unionist circles in NI.

Issues that are uncontroversial in themselves will assume vast symbolic significance, and threaten the peace of our island.

The UK is likely be forced to make side deals with the US on issues like hormone treated beef, GMOs  and chlorinated chicken. The US questions the scientific basis for the existing EU restrictions, and has won a WTO case on beef on that basis.  It would probably win on chlorinated chicken too.

 If the UK conceded to the US on hormones and chlorination, this would create control problems at the border between the UK and the EU, wherever that border is in Ireland.

Either UK officials would enforce EU rules on hormones and chlorination on entry of beef or chicken to this island, or there would be a huge international court case.

All this shows that, in the absence of some sort of Partnership Agreement between the EU and the UK, relations could spiral out of control.

Ireland , and the EU, needs its best team on the pitch to ensure that this  does not happen!

BREXIT….HEADING FOR THE CLIFF EDGE

Last Friday Michel Barnier gave a stark warning about the lack of progress in the Brexit negotiation. 

But this week Boris Johnson has come back to work. 

Perhaps it was unrealistic for Michel Barnier to have expected the UK to  have engaged seriously with the trade offs and concessions, essential to a long term Agreement  , while the UK Prime Minister was ill.

Brexit is Boris’ big thing. He made it. Other Tory Ministers have no leeway to make Brexit decisions without his personal imprimatur. He has purged from his party of all significant figures who might advocate a different vision of  Brexit. 

The point of Michel Barnier’s intervention is that, now that Boris is back at work, he will need to  give a clear strategic lead to the UK negotiating team.  If he fails to do that, we will end up, on 1 January 2021, with No Deal and an incipient trade war between the UK and the EU.  Ireland  will be in the front line.

 The scars left by Covid 19 will eventually heal, but those left by a wilfully bad Brexit,  whether brought  about deliberately or by inattention, may never heal. 

This is because a bad Brexit will be a deliberate political act, whereas Covid 19 is just a reminder of our shared human vulnerability.  

Boris Johnson signed up to a Withdrawal Treaty with the EU, which  legally committed the UK to customs, sanitary, and phytosanitary controls between Britain and Northern Ireland, so as to avoid controls between North and South in Ireland.

 So far, Michel Barnier says he has detected no evidence that the UK is making serious preparations do this.  An attempt by the UK to back out of these ratified legal commitments would be seen as a sign of profound bad faith. 

Michel Barnier said that negotiating by video link was “surreal”, but that the deadlines to be met are very real.

 The first deadline is the end of June.  This is the last date at which an extension of the negotiating period beyond the end of December might be agreed by both sides. While the EU side would almost certainly agree to an extension, there is no sign that the UK will agree. Tory politicians repeatedly say they will not extend. 

This tight deadline would be fine, if the UK was engaging seriously, and purposefully, in the negotiation.

 But, according to Michel Barnier, the UK has not yet even produced a full version of a draft Agreement,that would reflect their expectations. The EU side produced its full draft weeks ago.  Without full texts it is hard to begin real negotiation. So far the UK has only produced texts of selected  bits of  the proposed Treaty.

 But the UK  insist that Barnier keep these bits of  draft UK text secret, and not share them with the 27 Member States. Giving Barnier texts that he cannot share with those on whose behalf he is negotiating, is just wasting his time. It seems to me the UK negotiators are adopting this strange tactic because they have no clear political direction from their own side.  They do not know whether these bits of text are even acceptable in the UK!

In the political declaration, that accompanied the Withdrawal Agreement, Boris Johnson agreed his government would use its best endeavours to reach agreement on fisheries by the end of July. Such an agreement would be vital if the UK fishing industry were to be able to continue to export its surplus fish to the EU. Apparently there has not been serious engagement from the British side on this matter. 

The other issue on which Barnier detected a lack of engagement by the UK was the so called “level playing field” question.

 The EU wants binding guarantees that the UK will not, through state subsidies, or through lax environmental or labour rules, give its exporters an artificial advantage over EU (and Irish) competitors.

 The “level playing field” is becoming a difficult issue within the EU itself.

 In the response to the Covid 19 economic downturn, some of the wealthier EU states (like Germany) are giving generous cash/liquidity supports to the industries in their own countries. 

 On the other hand, EU states with weaker budgetary positions (Italy, Spain and perhaps even Ireland) cannot compete with this.

 It is understandable that temporary help may be given to prevent firms going bust in the wake of the Covid 19 disruption.  But what is temporary at the beginning, can easily become indefinite. And what is indefinite can become permanent. Subsidies are addictive.

 The reason we have a COMMON Agricultural policy in the EU is that, when the Common Market was created 60 years ago, nobody wanted rich countries to be able to give their farmers an advantage over farmers in countries whose governments could not afford the same level of help. The same consideration applies to industry. Subsidies should be equal, or should not be given at all.

 State aid must be regulated, inside the EU, if a level playing field is to be preserved. To make a convincing case for a level playing field between the EU and the UK, the EU side will need to show it is doing so internally. This will be a test for President Von der Leyen, as a German Commissioner.

Which way will Boris Johnson turn on the terms of a deal with the EU?

I think it is unlikely he will look for an extension of the Transition period beyond the end of this year. 

He wants a hard Brexit, a clean break as he would misleadingly call it,  but he knows it will be very painful.

 He will probably reckon that the pain of a hard Brexit ,or no Deal, Brexit at the end of December, will be concealed by the even greater and more immediate pain of the Covid 19 Slump. Brexit will not be blamed for the pain. But if Brexit is postponed until January 2022, the Brexit pain will be much more visible to voters.

The Conservative Party has become the Brexit Party. It is driven by a narrative around re establishing British identity, and is quite insensitive to economic or trade arguments. It wants Brexit done quickly because it fears the British people might change their minds. That is why there is such a mad rush. It is not rational. It is imperative!

A FRAUGHT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THE UK IS LOOMING

 #banksy

There are increasing grounds for concern that the UK is backing away from the legal and political commitments it made last October in its Withdrawal Agreement with the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement was made before the UK General Election, when Boris Johnson led a minority government. Now he has an overall majority, and the prospect of four more years in office. He has more weight to throw around, at least in the short term. Some of the governments on the EU side are not in such a strong position.

 There is a suspicion that he may now be backing away from legally and politically binding commitments he gave to the EU last October in order to appear to “get Brexit done” before his General Election.

For example, the newly appointed Northern Ireland Secretary has stated that there “will be no border down the Irish Sea”.  Boris Johnson has made similar comments.

 

This could be interpreted as meaning that the UK was acting in bad faith when it agreed last October to the Withdrawal Agreement and to its legally binding protocol on Ireland.

In the Protocol, the UK committed itself to what amount to border controls between Britain and Northern Ireland.

While the word “border” is not used in the Protocol, the UK accepted in Article 5, that  EU customs duties would be collected on goods coming into Northern Ireland from Britain which if those goods were “at risk of subsequently being moved” to the rest of Ireland and thus into the EU.

It was also envisaged that goods would also have to check for the purposes of collecting the appropriate amount of VAT, and to verifying their origin. EU officials were to have a right to be present when this checking was being done, so as to assure themselves that the UK officials were correctly interpreting the EU laws that would apply in Northern Ireland.

The protocol contains detailed provisions for determining how UK goods, that were at risk of entering the EU through Ireland, might be identified and controlled, and how the customs duties on them might be collected. This was not to be done at the land border in Ireland, so it had to be done before the goods entered Northern Ireland, effectively on either side of the Irish Sea.

It is difficult to see how the new Northern Secretary’s comment the there would be no border in the Irish Sea can be compatible with the legally binding protocol agreed to by the UK, unless one interprets that the word “border”  as only applying to a border on land.

The UK Government also seems to backing away from the commitments, on ensuring fair competition, it made in the Political Declaration which it agreed with the EU as the framework for the Withdrawal Agreement.

This Political Declaration, while not legally binding in the same way as the Withdrawal Treaty itself, is part of the Withdrawal process under Article 50 of the EU Treaties, and it is referred to in the Withdrawal Treaty.

For either the EU or the UK to back away from what they had agreed in the Political Declaration would amount to bad faith, and could poison future relations.

One can accept that, once the UK leaves the EU, the EU should accept the autonomy of the UK’s decision making processes, and vice versa.

 It a legal sense, there should be a relationship of equals between the EU and the UK.

But if there is to be trade between the EU and UK, it is only common sense that there  be  basic compatibility of standards. Indeed most modern trade agreements are more about standards than they are about mere tariffs and quotas.

The Political Declaration, agreed by the UK last October, makes repeated references to the need for  provisions for a level playing field and fair competition in any future agreement between the UK and the EU.

 Article 17 says the Partnership between the UK and the EU should ensure

a level playing field for open and fair competition

 between UK and EU firms.

 Article 77 commits the UK and the EU to

uphold the common high standards applicable to the EU and the UK at the end of the transition period in areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change and relevant tax matters.

The common standards applying at the end of the transition period at the end of this year are the existing EU standards. The UK agreed there would be no rolling back of these  EU standards.

 But Boris Johnson said, in a speech in Greenwich earlier this month, that

There is no need for a free trade agreement to involve accepting EU rules on competition policy, subsidies, social protection, the environment or anything else anymore than the EU is obliged to accept UK rules.

Prime Minister Johnson’s EU negotiator, David Frost went further this week when he said

to think that we might accept EU supervise of so called level playing field issues simply fails to understand the point of what we are doing

adding that the UK must be free to “set laws that suit us” and that

 this is the  point of the whole project.

On the face of it, these statements appear to be a flat contradiction of what Mr. Johnson and his government agreed to last October in the Political Declaration.

The level playing field provisions in the Political Declaration clearly envisage mutual supervision of the EU by the UK, and vice versa, to ensure that neither side does anything that interferes with open and fair competition or rolls back standards.

There may be some room for benign interpretation.

Prime Minister Johnson could say he is referring to rules to be made in future by either the EU or the UK, and not to the rules in force now.

 But the Political Declaration is only says that the “common high standards “, in force at the end of the transition period, should not be reduced. It does not prevent new rules being made by either side, so long as they do not reduce these standards. So it is difficult to know what Mr. Johnson and Mr. Frost are talking about.

 The agreed Declaration does not require the UK or the EU to use exactly the same words to maintain those standards, just that standards should not be reduced.

The statement by David Frost, rejecting any EU supervision of what the UK does, could undermine the Political Declaration in a fundamental way.

The UK, if it wants good relations with all its immediate neighbours, should dial back the rhetoric. Trust needs to be rebuilt.

The EU should also be careful not to over estimate its own negotiating leverage, and not to look for certainty on everything.

WHAT STICKING POINTS IN UK/EU TRADE DEAL?

The UK government will shortly begin the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the European Union. The deal Leo Varadkar made with Boris Johnson, on the location of border controls, will be vital in keeping the UK close to the EU.

 Before the negotiations start, the EU will have worked out a detailed negotiating mandate, drawing on its experience of previous international trade agreement into which it has entered, of which there are many. 

Once finalised, the EU mandate will become public, making any departure from its terms difficult. 

This is especially important if, as is likely, the final agreement has to be approved by the national parliaments of each of the 27 member states. If the eventual agreement goes beyond a bare bones trade agreement covering goods, and includes services as well, ratification by all national parliament will be likely to be required.  

On the UK side, it is assumed that similar work is now under way. But the task for the UK is bigger than that of the EU.

 The UK also needs to negotiate replacement agreements with all the other countries, with which it now has agreements as an EU member, but which will lapse once the UK leaves the EU.

 In addition, the UK will also be hoping to negotiate an agreement with the US. 

The demands of the other countries, with which the UK will be negotiating trade agreements later, will not necessarily be compatible with what the EU will want in its agreement with the UK.  Chlorinated chicken from the US is a case in point. 

The UK will probably have to conclude it deal with the EU first, because of the very tight timelines that the UK has chosen to impose on itself in the Withdrawal Agreement. The UK may find itself having to make concessions to the EU at the expense of other potential future trade partners. Alternatively, the UK may gamble on getting a better deal from the US or someone else, and thus sacrifice markets in the EU, in favour of a yet to be agreed deal with the US, or someone else. In this, agriculture will be a key battleground, with vital Irish interests at stake.

 It will be high stakes poker played against a tight deadline. Until the negotiations are under way, it will not be clear exactly where all the difficult choices, may be.

The Agreement that the EU has with Canada is a model that may be followed. This Agreement provides for free trade in most goods, but not services. It has detailed chapters, accompanied by principles and dispute settlement mechanisms, on issues as diverse as technical barriers to trade, dumping, subsidies, public contracts, state enterprises, competition policy, intellectual property, environmental standards, telecoms, water quality, fisheries and agriculture.

As an EU member, the UK has settled understandings on all these matters with its 27 EU partners. Tt the end of this month, that will change.

Outside the EU, the UK will have the freedom, unilaterally, to depart from its present EU based standards, and make its own rules. Boris Johnson has said this is the “whole point” of Brexit.   

 The EU has no way of knowing what changes this, or a future, UK government might make in social, environmental, or product rules. Political assurances from the present UK government will be of little value. The EU side will demand legally binding assurances that will tie the UK down, no matter who is in power in Westminster. All sorts of hypothetical situations will have to be anticipated. Appropriate penalties will have to be agreed in principle.

Both sides will need to make new rules from time to time, as new challenges emerge.

 As an EU member, the UK has had a democratic say in new EU rules. Outside the EU, the UK will have  to rely on diplomacy, rather than democracy, to protect its interests. 

 If the EU/ Canada Agreement is a guide, a multiplicity permanent committees of EU and UK officials will have to be set up, on a permanent basis, the iron out disputes if standards diverge.  Arbitrators and judges will be needed. 

“Taking back control”   will not turn out to be as clean, or as simple, as Brexiteers expected.

 A huge challenge will be that of ensuring there is a “level playing field” between UK and EU firms, doing business in one another’s markets. If either side changes its labour, social or environmental standards in future,  in a way that reduces costs for its firms , there are liable to be complaints that the playing field is no longer level. The playing field will not be level if the value of sterling is kept artificially low, or if the UK allows the importation of cheap inputs, that the EU had banned.

 Level Playing field issues, like these, arise in every trade negotiation, especially between close neighbours. For instance, the US has recently insisted on changes the Mexican labour rules to protect US car makers from Mexican competition. It has complained about Chinese currency policy.

 Permanent adjudication mechanisms will be needed established to decide if the playing field has, in fact, been skewed unfairly. Issues that are now ironed out informally in the EU Council of Ministers, or inside the Commission, may, in future, become the subject of high profile disputes. This will mean more uncertainty for business and may inhibit investment. Many of these disputes may involve Ireland.

The best hope of reducing disputes is if UK policy stays close to EU policy. The more UK rules diverge from EU rules, the more severe will have to be the controls that the UK will have to impose , within the UK itself but across the Irish Sea, on goods entering Northern Ireland, which might   eventually enter the EU Single Market through Ireland. The UK will want to avoid this. The UK government will have a strong political incentive to minimize the scale of these barriers within the UK .  

So thanks to Leo Varadkar’s deal with Boris Johnson in the Wirral, the UK will have a strong incentive to adopt standards close to, the same as, those of  the EU. That will be the ONLY way to avoid trade barriers within the UK. If so, Leo Varadkar will have earned an important place in European history.

CAN A CHAOTIC “CRASH OUT” BREXIT, IN DECEMBER 2020, BE AVOIDED?

“Let’s get Brexit done” is Boris Johnson’s election slogan. His implication is that, once he gets a working parliamentary majority to ratify his revised Withdrawal Treaty, Brexit will be quickly done and dusted. 

This is over optimistic, to put it mildly.

There are three realistic outcomes to the Election, 

  • a Tory majority ( the most likely scenario at this stage),  
  • a Labour led government with the support of other parties, or   
  • a  hung Parliament in which no one can command a majority and form a government.

Even if Boris Johnson wins a majority, to get Brexit done he will still have to conclude a very complex trade negotiation with the EU, within an almost impossibly tight self imposed time line, by December 2020 (the end of the post Withdrawal Transition period).

He has tied himself be a commitment to Nigel Farage that there will be no extension of the December 2020 deadline. This is how he got the Brexit Party withdrew its candidates in all Tory held constituencies.

Reneging on that promise, because the negotiation need more time, would be costly for Boris Johnson, especially as it would  also extend the period in which the UK would have to continue contributing to EU funds.

If he were to change his mind and look for an extension of the post Withdrawal transition period beyond 2020, he will have to give notice of this by July of next year. The Withdrawal Treaty (Article 132) only allows for one extension of either one or two years. This is different from Article 50 extensions on which there is no legal limit.

If the deal is not done before the end of the (very short) transition period, then the UK crashes out of the EU with no deal at all. Remember this Trade deal will have to be ratified in the parliaments of all the EU member states, unlike the Withdrawal deal which only needed ratification by the European Parliament. So a crash out/no deal scenario is a major risk.

The implications of this for Ireland, and for the UK itself would be grave. 

This is only one scenario, the Tory majority scenario

The other  scenario concerns  what happens if Boris Johnson fails to get a majority.

Obviously if he fails , the next steps will  have to be decided by a replacement government. 

But who will head such a government, and what will be their Brexit policy? Neither question can be answered at this stage.

It is unlikely that Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party can have a majority on its own.  But Labour might be able to form a majority with support from the Scottish National Party, in return for a pledge to hold a referendum on Scottish independence.

Another possibility is that Labour could make an arrangement with the Liberal Democrats, but they would want a Prime Minister other than Jeremy Corbyn.

That could happen. If a majority of MPs said, in writing, that they wanted as Prime Minister, an alternative named Labour Party MP, not the leader , the Queen would call on that MP to form a government.

Either of these Labour led alternative governments would hold another referendum on Brexit . It might also seek amendments to the existing Withdrawal Treaty before holding that referendum.

This process would take a year or more to complete, so a lengthy extension of Article 50 would have to be sought. Meanwhile to UK would continue to contribute to EU funds.

All this would be quite messy, but it would be  preferable to a crash out, no deal, Brexit a year from now, which might occur if a majority Tory government were to make unrealistic trade demands of the EU.

A third possibility is that no potential Prime Minister could be assured of a majority in Parliament. Given that the UK now has a 5 party system, rather than the 2 party one it had for the past century, this is a real possibility. The Fixed Term Parliament Act requires the calling of another Election, 14 days after a no confidence vote, if no  government can secure the confidence of Parliament within those 14 days.

But let’s acknowledge that, at the moment, the most likely outcome is a Tory majority government. What happens when it proceeds to implement the revised Withdrawal Agreement and negotiate a Free Trade Agreement(FTA) with the EU? 

Given that the new Tory Parliamentary Party will be more radically pro Brexit than the old one, the UK negotiating position on the FTA   could be very demanding and very difficult for the EU to accept. Some of the new Tory MPs might even prefer a “no deal” on ideological grounds.

 Before negotiations with the UK begin, the EU side will have to secure a negotiating mandate from the 27 member states. 

 This will not be easy. Many states will have sensitive issues vis a vis the UK, for example

  • fisheries for Spain, 
  • agriculture for France, 
  • rules of origin for all members, and crucially,  
  • the maintenance of a level playing field for competition between firms inside the EU and those in the UK. 

Boris Johnson has said that, for him, the UK being able to have different environmental, social and product standards is the “whole point “of Brexit.  

There are real fears that UK would try to undercut the EU in these fields. 

So the EU will demand firm justiciable guarantees in the FTA that this will not happen. They will not take anything on trust. They will want a court to decide.

 Likewise, the EU will want justiciable guarantees that the UK will not give subsidies to its industries, of a kind that would not be permitted in the EU. 

The EU demand of binding arbitration will raise an allergic issue for Brexiteers.  The idea, that a “foreign court” might tell them what to do, is anathema to them.

If that is not agreed, it is hard to see how the EU could give up the possibility of introducing tariffs on UK exports to the EU, to level up the playing field.

Similar problems arise for agriculture and fisheries. The UK needs to decide what sort of farm policies it will have and if these will depart radically from EU norms.

If the UK tries to stop access for EU trawlers to its fishing grounds, it cannot expect tariff free access to EU markets for UK fish exports. Physical confrontations at sea are a real possibility.

There will also have to be a negotiation about cooperation between UK and Europol, and about money laundering. 

The position of Norway, will have to be considered. It contributes to EU funds in return for access to the Single Market. The UK cannot expect more, for a lesser contribution, than Norway makes. 

The position of countries like Japan and Canada, who have trade agreements with the EU , will have to be considered. They will look for any concessions the UK is given, other things being equal.

The earliest that the two sides would even be ready to start negotiating these difficult questions would be March 2020. On that basis, it is hard to see how it could all be wrapped up by December of next year. 

Remember the Canada Agreement with the EU took eight YEARS to negotiate, and the political atmosphere between Canada was much better, and the stakes much less, than is now the case between the UK and the EU.

Brexit is far from done. It is entering its dramatic second Act.

650 DIFFERENT ELECTIONS WILL DECIDE BREXIT

The UK General Election on 12 December will decide whether Brexit

  • goes ahead on the basis of Boris Johnson’s deal, 
  • is subject to a referendum or
  • is simply revoked.

But the result of the election will be affected by things that have little to do with Brexit.     The implications for taxpayers of Labour’s policies will be scrutinised. So will the personalities of the party leaders. The Conservative record will be a factor, as will their recent conversion to high spending.

In effect, the issue will be decided in 650 separate elections. Each constituency is different.

 A strong showing by a party, that has no chance of winning the seat itself, may siphon more votes away from one of the leading parties than it does from another, and this differential could tip the balance in favour of a party that would otherwise have lost the seat.

The UK electoral system forces voters to make tactical choices.

 If a voter wants to influence things, he/she may have to vote for a candidate, who has a good chance of winning and with whom they agree on some important issue, rather than for a candidate who may be closer to their views, but has no chance. 

Tactical voting is a very difficult exercise. Getting reliable information will be hard for voters to do. Disinformation and fake news will be factors.

The Conservatives are targeting Labour seats in constituencies that voted Leave in 2016, many in the Midlands and the North of England. But the Brexit Party will also target these same seats and the Brexit party does not have to defend a record in government, and is less associated with “austerity”.

The latest polls are very inconsistent.

 In the last ten days, 

A You Gov poll gave the Conservatives 37%, Labour 22%, Liberal Democrats 19% and the Brexit Party 12%

But an Opinium Poll gave the Conservatives 40%, Labour 24%, Lib Dems 15% and the Brexit Party 10 %.

These polls, taken before the election was called, suggest a Conservative majority government.

 But as the campaign goes on the Brexit issue will fade, and other issues may come to the fore, not least the slow performance of the UK economy in recent years.

My own experience is that polls, taken before an election is actually called, are not good predictors of the final result.

But a poll taken a week after the campaign has started is a much better indicator.

Other opinion polls suggest a deeply divided electorate. A poll done by Edinburgh and Cardiff Universities suggests a deeply polarised electorate.

Brexit appears to be a Conservative Party obsession, that is not shared by the supporters of other parties.

For Example, 82% of those who intend to vote Conservative say the unravelling of the peace process in Ireland would be a price worth paying to get Brexit done, whereas only 12% of Labour and 4% of Liberal Democrats are of that opinion. 

There is a similar difference between the parties on the risk that Brexit could lead to a referendum on Scottish independence. 

The gap between younger and older voters is also stark. 21% of those under 24 felt Brexit was worth risking the Irish peace process for, whereas 68% of those over 65 were prepared to take that risk. 

Older voters are more reckless, which goes against the conventional stereotype.

There is also a difference between the parties on how they perceive the likelihood of certain things actually happening.

Only 28% of Conservative voters believe Brexit is likely to lead to an unravelling of the Irish peace process, whereas 77% of Labour voters believe it is likely to do so. This suggests that people believe what they want to believe.

On the possibility of Brexit leading to a referendum on Scottish independence, 66% of English voters believe it will happen. There is only a modest difference between the parties in this. Very few actually want Scotland to leave the UK, but many are prepared to take that risk.

The great tragedy is that the British people, in a referendum during the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition, rejected the Alternative vote electoral system. This would have given it a more evenly representative parliament. It would have made coalition the norm. If so, there would have been no Brexit referendum.

A Fixed Term Parliament combined with a winner take all electoral system was bound to lead to a crisis.  A fixed term Parliament would have been workable if there was a more proportional system of election, but it is not workable in a political culture, like that of the UK, which rejects coalitions.

Irish people will have to sit and watch an important aspect of our future being decided under a flawed electoral system which favours polarisation and over simplification. 

THE BORIS VERSION OF BREXIT

http://www.chathamhouse.org/

Make no mistake about it, the latest version of Brexit is a very hard Brexit.

The UK Government has abandoned the legally binding commitment in the previous deal to align with EU regulatory standards to the greatest extent possible. That is now dropped in favour of a political aspiration.

The more the UK diverges from EU standards the greater is the likelihood that the EU will have to place tariff and other barriers in the way of UK imports to the EU, and now also to Northern Ireland. The problem will be particularly acute for agricultural goods.

The EU/UK trade negotiation has yet to begin, but I believe it will be both lengthy and difficult. This is a direct result of the “red lines” for Brexit chosen by the UK (no custom union membership, no single market membership and no ECJ jurisdiction). This was a legitimate choice for the UK to make, but the costs of the choice are yet to be revealed and understood. When they are, it will be too late to change course. 

Many in the UK say they just want to “get Brexit over with”. The impatience is understandable, but the truth is that agreeing the Withdrawal Treaty will not actually get Brexit “over with”. The additional bureaucracy will be permanent. If there is not to be a no deal crash out, the transition period will have to be much long than the end of 2020, because the trade negotiation will only be in its early stages by then.

The only way to get  the agony of Brexit over with, would be to revoke Brexit. There is little popular support for that, so Brexit will drag on and preoccupy British politics for years.

By choosing a harder Brexit than Mrs May, and agreeing that the controls will be in the Irish sea, Boris Johnson has chosen to prioritize the interests of  hardline Brexiteers in England over the interests of the DUP in Northern Ireland. Such a choice was inherent in Brexit, which is why it will remain a puzzle for historians to discern why the DUP chose to support Brexit with such enthusiasm in the first place.

 THE WORLD AFTER BREXIT

I would like to turn now to the world after Brexit, and about the European Union, of which we will continue to be a member and in whose success we will now have a disproportionate interest.

The world has become a much more unpredictable place than it was 10 years ago. 

The era of easy decisions may be over.

A European country, Ukraine, has been successfully invaded by it neighbour, Russia, breaking solemn undertakings that had been given. We have been reminded of the importance of defence.

There is widespread evidence of interference in elections and democratic processes by authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. Voting software is being infected. Campaigns are being hacked. National rules on election spending can be circumvented via the social media.

The United States has created doubt around its defence commitments to Europe. It has walked away from its Kurdish allies in Syria, and Europe was not able to fill the gap, although the refugees from that conflict are more likely to end up in Europe than in America. In fact Europe is dependent on Turkey and North Africa to curb mass migration to the southern shores of the EU.

The EU has not developed a migration policy, which, if properly organised , could bring dynamism to our continent to compensate for the loss of dynamism that will inevitably flow from the ageing of the native European population.

The US is undermining the rules based international order in the field of trade. It is refusing to allow the appointment of replacement judges to the WTO’s appellate court, which will soon lead to that court ceasing to function. This is happening just at the time that our nearest neighbour may find itself relying on the WTO once its post Brexit transition period expires. 

THE RISE OF CHINA

China is returning to the dominant position it held in the world economy in the two millennia up to 1800.

 It is doing this on the strength of its human capital, not its physical capital. It is educating more engineers that the US and the EU combined.

 It is doing it through its competitive and  innovative firms, not through its monopolistic state enterprises. Chinese R and D spending will exceed US Rand D this year and far exceeds EU R and D.

 It is ahead of everyone in 5G communications, at the time the world economy is becoming ever more digital.

Chinese firms own Volvo, Pirelli and recently bought the firms supplying robots to the German car industry. EU could not buy the equivalent Chinese firms.

Chinese military spending exceeds that of all EU states combined and is already half that of the US.

 If the US thinks it can use trade policy to arrest Chinese development, it is probably making a mistake. 

But the US is right to insist on fair competition. China must be treated in the WTO as a developed country, and not get concessions intended for much poorer countries.

In its response to the Chinese challenge, the EU should maintain its robust competition policy and should not try to pick industrial winners from Brussels.

THE RESPONSE OF EUROPE

Europe would be much better placed to defend its own interests, and to act as a balancing power in the world, if the euro functioned as a global reserve currency.

 To achieve that, we need to create a Capital Markets Union and complete the Banking Union. This requires a harmonisation of company insolvency rules throughout the EU or the eurozone.

The Eurozone must have a capacity to cope with localized shocks and to prevent contagion.  We need viable proposals for a eurozone wide reinsurance of bank deposits, and eurozone wide reinsurance of the unemployment  benefit systems of member states..

BREXIT IS A SETBACK FOR EUROPE……..STAGNATION MUST BE AVOIDED

There is no doubt but Brexit has been a setback for Europe.

True, the EU had maintained its unity and stability, in stark contrast to the way in which the UK system has been convulsed by the divorce. But that does not take away from the fact that we are losing a relatively young, diverse and creative member state. 

The EU’s strategic weight in the world will be reduced by the absence of the UK.

The population of the remaining members of the  EU are, in global terms, relatively elderly, pessimistic and risk averse. This could lead the EU to make big mistakes.

I give some examples of this.

Many member states refuse even to contemplate the amendment of the EU Treaties because of the risk of defeats in referenda. If that remains the attitude, the EU will simply stagnate. Every successful human organisation must have the capacity to change its rules if this is demonstrably necessary. The US is unable to amend its constitution and we can see the problems that has led to.

Unlike the US, the EU has been able to attract and accommodate new member states over the last 50 years. At last week’s Summit, France the Netherlands and Denmark blocked the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia even though that country has done everything the EU asked to qualify, even changing its name, which was a highly sensitive matter. 

The fact that this rejectionism was led by President Macron, who makes great speeches about European integration, is particularly disquieting. I hope he changes his mind. Yes, we need tougher means of ensuring that the rule of law in respected in the most rigorous way but that could have been dealt with in the negotiations with North Macedonia, which would have gone on for years any way.

 THE SINGLE MARKET

We must defend the integrity of the EU Single Market, at the borders of the European Union and throughout its territory. 

Ireland must be seen to be, fully compliant with EU Single Market rules. Otherwise Ireland’s geographic position will be used against it by competitors for the investment.

The EU Single Market is not complete. There is much more to do.

An April 2019 Study “Mapping the Cost of non Europe” estimated that 

    + completing the  classic single market would add  713 billion euros to the EU economy. 

    + completing Economic and Monetary Union would add a further 322 billion, and    

    + completing a digital single market a further  178 billion euros. 

 A more integrated energy market would save a further 231 billion and a more integrated EU approach to fighting organised crime would be worth 82 billion.

 Cross border VAT fraud is costing 40 billion. This will be an area of special concern in regard to traffic between Britain and Northern Ireland.

These are some of the reasons why we must complete the Single Market.

Services account for three quarters of EU GDP. 

 But  we have been very slow in creating a single EU market for services. 

 In the field of Services, only one legislative proposal had been adopted during the term of the outgoing Commission, a proportionality test for new regulations on professions.

 All other proposals are blocked.

 I think that a major obstacle is vested interests in national or regional governments, who do not want to give up power.

By completing the Single Market, the EU can show that it has much more to offer to the world than a post Brexit Britain.

To help complete the Single Market, Ireland should be open to qualified majority voting on energy and climate matters. 

We should also be open to carefully defined individual amendments to the EU Treaties if they can be shown to the public to deliver real benefits.

A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD

The existing Withdrawal Agreement protects UK environmental, product and labour standards, in a way that a mere Trade Agreement will never do.

 In any trade negotiation with a post Brexit Britain, maintaining a level competitive playing field will be vital.

 No subsidies, no cartels, and no undercutting of EU standards must be insisted upon.

Likewise the UK must not be allowed to undercut the EU on worker protection, environmental and product quality standards. The UK will have to set up bureaucracies to devise and enforce UK standards. 200 EU environmental laws will have to be replaced by the UK. Westminster will be busy.

EU WIDE DEMOCRACY

 It is over 40 years since the first European Parliament election.

 While the  EP elections are hotly contested, the contests are often really about national issues.

 A genuine EU wide debate does not take place, because the elections are confined within in national constituencies. An EU “polis” or public opinion has not yet been created.

My own view is that the President of the Commission should be elected separately from the Parliament, using a system of proportional representation (PR). 

We must have strong national democracy if we are to have a strong EU, and we must have strong national democracy if we are to have strong states.

 There are remarkable differences in the level of confidence people in Europe feel in their own national democracy. According to a recent Pew Poll, 72% of Swedes have confidence in how their national democracy works. Within the Netherlands confidence in their system was  68%, in Poland it was 61% and in Germany 65%. 

But , at the other end of the spectrum, only  31% of British, and 32% of Spaniards and Italians had confidence in their own democratic systems.

To build confidence in the EU, we also need to rebuild confidence in democracy itself, at every level of governance

THE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE NEW UK BACKSTOP PROPOSALS

There is, at last, some movement in the Brexit negotiation.

On the UK side, Boris Johnson previously insisted on the Irish backstop being scrapped. Now he is making proposals (unacceptable so far to the EU) to rewrite it.

On the EU side, there is a movement too.

 The present Agreement contains a backstop to cover the whole UK. Now the EU is apparently willing to contemplate a backstop confined to Northern Ireland (NI) alone. This is a step backward for Ireland.  An “NI only” backstop would not protect Irish trade with Britain which is more valuable than trade across the border with NI.

Why are the new UK proposals for an NI only backstop unacceptable so far to the EU?

It is hard to give a complete answer to this question because the UK has insisted that its legal text for the new backstop remain confidential. This is a pity because any such text could benefit from constructive criticism from outside the narrow confines of the UK negotiation team and the Article 50 Task Force.

The only thing we have to go on is an Explanatory note published by the UK Government.

The note says the UK Government wants to uphold the Belfast Agreement of 1998. This Agreement was made in good faith by the then Irish government, on the basis of joint Irish and British membership of the EU Single Market, which had come into force only five years earlier in 1993, and had removed trade barriers between the two parts of Ireland.

 If there was at that time any possibility of the UK ever withdrawing from the Single Market, it would have been for the UK side to have brought that up in the negotiations. Neither the then UK government, nor the Tory Opposition, did so.

  If they had, there would probably have been no Belfast Agreement.

This is because the Belfast Agreement is all about convergence between North and South, as well as convergence between Ireland and Britain.  In contrast, Brexit inevitably is about divergence between North and South, AND divergence between Britain and Ireland. At a fundamental level they are incompatible. 

While everybody may now be acting in full good faith, there is also the issue for the EU of the structural reliability of the UK as a negotiating partner. 

 A Conservative government, with a parliamentary majority, signed a joint paper with the EU, committing it to protect the Belfast Agreement and to avoid border controls.  Now another Conservative government, in the same Parliament but now without a majority, wants to renege on that. 

UK public opinion sees no problem with this, but it is difficult for the EU. The EU would be setting a precedent for future negotiations, with the UK and with others. 

The latest UK proposals would align the regulatory standards for goods in NI, with EU standards. This is a welcome move, but it would mean new controls, between NI and Britain, to check compliance with EU standards. On the other hand it would remove the need for controls, for this particular purpose, at the land border in Ireland.

 But the proposals completely ignore tariffs there will be between the EU and UK. Once the transition period is over, imports from the UK will have to pay EU tariffs, which are quite high for some products, particularly agricultural ones. 

These tariffs will have to be collected at or near the land border in Ireland. The proposal to align NI and EU regulatory standards for goods does not solve that problem of tariffs on those same goods. 

The collection of these tariffs at or near the border will be highly contentious, although it will be absolutely necessary if Ireland is to remain in the EU. 

 If , in future, the UK  makes a trade agreements with a third country (say the US), and has to make concessions on either tariffs or goods standards to get these agreements, there would  then have to be additional or wider controls. These wider controls would be the land border for tariffs, and between NI and UK for standards.

 This problem would get steadily worse as time goes on. Boris Johnson has said that the UK will deliberately diverge from EU labour, environmental and product standards and will be making many concessions in his trade deals, so the scope and scale of the controls will become greater all the time.

 These will be either on the land border, or on the Irish Sea. Both go against the convergence goals of the Belfast Agreement. 

The new UK proposals envisage a system of notifications to prevent prohibited products entering the EU and for the collection of VAT. It remains to be seen if these can be rendered compatible with the EU Customs code, which envisages the tariff, tax, and quality status of goods being checked at the same place, at a customs post on the border.

 I expect the Article 50 Task force are now subjecting these UK proposals to forensic examination. They will ensure that Ireland’s status as a fully compliant part of the EU Single Market is not put in doubt and that the VAT is collected.  

The entire UK package would create dangerous new opportunities for smuggling, and smuggling is often used to finance political terrorism and mafia practices. 

The UK proposals are conditional on “Consent” in Northern Ireland to adherence to EU goods and food standards and to the Single Electricity Market.

 They would not to come into effect, without the consent of the NI Executive and Assembly. This consent would have to be renewed every four years. 

 The NI Assembly nowadays seems incapable of meeting, let alone of making decisions, so I do not think the EU being happy to delegate the future of any hard won compromise it makes with the UK to it. It would be giving a regional body, in a non EU state, a power to obviate an Agreement into which the EU would have entered in good faith every four years. We must not forget that the NI Assembly operates on the basis of a “petition of concern” whereby, a minority ( 30 out of 90)  of members in the Assembly, could block consent to deal . 

This  NI “consent” provision is to be inserted into the heart of what one hopes will to be a balanced, and hard fought, overall deal between the UK and the EU. I cannot see the EU agreeing to  all this being subject to the ongoing vagaries of NI politics. 

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